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I. PROLOGUE

As law firms have grown markedly through mergers and lateral hiring, the probability of disqualifying conflicts of interest has exponentially increased. To avoid disqualification of an entire firm where a
newly-hired lawyer's past clients' interests diverge from those of the

firm's present clients, firms increasingly attempt to "screen" the lawyer
from providing information to or receiving information from her new
partners.
Screening is generally accepted in the case of government lawyers
entering private practice, but it is more controversial where applied to
lawyers leaving one private law firm to join another. Most states have
rejected the practice; federal courts are split on the issue. Some com-

mentators hail the practice as the only way to assure lawyer mobility and
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. I would like to thank
Nathan Crystal, Susan Martyn, Nancy Moore, and Stephen Ripps for their review and comments
regarding earlier drafts of the article, and Dr. Barbara Chesney for her help in clarifying questions
and her advice regarding compilation of information. I also appreciate the research assistance of
Robert Muller, Arlene De la Sema and Carey Young. I would also like to thank Donna Hunt for
her seemingly endless entry of data. In addition, I am grateful to the University of Toledo for its
support through a Summer research grant. Finally, as always, I am grateful to H. Terrence Smith
for his insight, enthusiasm, support and editing skill.
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client choice, while others assail the screen as being inevitably subject to
breach, either intentional or inadvertent. The American Law Institute
(ALl), when drafting the Restatement (Third) of The Law, The Law
Governing Lawyers (Restatement), engaged in great debate concerning
the appropriateness of screening lawyers leaving private firms. An initial draft of section 204 did not allow any use of a screen in that context.
The council charged with promulgating the Restatement and presenting
it to the full ALI membership instructed the Reporter to draft an alternative. Although the draft adopted by the full membership allows screening in limited circumstances, member opinions vary greatly on the topic.
Of all topics currently being discussed concerning the Restatement, section 204 is among the most controversial. It has received mixed reviews
by those courts that consider it.
Much recent discussion about the efficacy of screens has generated
more heat than light, with courts and law review article authors engaging
in a fair amount of fact-free analysis regarding the character and competence of lawyers attempting to erect screens. This article was conceived
with the notion that it might be worthwhile to ask questions of lawyers
actually in the business of constructing and maintaining screens in order
to determine how well screens work in practice.
To investigate the issue, I sent a questionnaire to large law firms in
states that allow screens in the private firm context. While the responses
suggest only a starting point for discussion, interesting insights were
gained from reviewing them. It appears that law firms are (mostly)
attempting in good faith to "do the right thing," but further rules regarding screens are necessary to assure that appropriate precautions are taken
and so lawyers' natural adversarial instincts do not serve as a basis to
defend the use of screens that ought not be erected in the first place.
In the sections that follow, general rules about conflicts of interest
and screens are explained. Then, the law firm responses to the questionnaires regarding these issues are reported and evaluated. A proposed
rule suggested by the responses is then made. Finally, sanctions
designed to reduce incentives for intentional breach are considered.
II.

EXPOSITION:

GENERAL RULES CONCERNING CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST

The lawyer, as a fiduciary, owes her client' the duty of undiluted
1. An attorney-client relationship exists not when the attorney believes it does, but when a
client reasonably believes it does. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580

F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978) (disqualifying a law firm from suit against various members of a trade
group because of earlier, substantially related representation of the trade group where members

reasonably believed law firm would maintain confidentiality); DeVaux v. American Home
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loyalty.2 As a result, she may not concurrently represent conflicting
interests 3 absent the client's informed consent.4
Assurance Co., 444 N.E.2d 355, 357 (Mass. 1983) (holding a lawyer who does not actually
undertake representation could be liable if person seeking legal services reasonably and
detrimentally relies upon a belief that representation was undertaken and attorney does nothing to
negate reliance). See generally ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9
note (3d ed. 1996) (When Is a Lawyer-Client Relationship Formed?) [hereinafter ANNOTATED
MODEL RULES]; Lee A. Pizzimenti, A Post Conference Reflection: In Defense of Fuzzy Rules and
Simple Truths, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 1263, 1271-75 (1996) [hereinafter Pizzimenti, Fuzzy Rules];
Nancy J. Moore, Expanding Duties of Attorneys to "Non-Clients": Reconceptualizing the
Attorney-Client Relationshipin Entity Representation and Other Inherently Ambiguous Situations,
45 S.C. L. REV. 659, 687-89 (1994).
2. For a discussion of the lawyer's fiduciary responsibilities, see infra notes 173-206 and
accompanying text.
3. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1980) [hereinafter
MODEL CODE]; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES]; Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 232-33 (2d Cir. 1977). See
generally Thomas D. Morgan, Suing a Current Client, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmics 1157 (1997);
Nathan M. Crystal, Disqualificationof Counselfor UnrelatedMatter Conflicts of Interest, 4 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHics 273 (1990); Developments in the Law: Conflicts of Interest in the Legal
Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1292-1315 (1981); Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in
the Simultaneous Representation of Multiple Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current
Confusion and Controversy, 61 TEX. L. REV. 211 (1982). Professor Crystal has observed that
disqualification is not a proper remedy in all cases of unrelated matter conflicts because it deprives
the new client of counsel and disrupts proceedings. Crystal, supra, at 276. He has advocated that
there be no disqualification if the firm is no longer representing the moving party if the firm still
represents the client, he suggests use of a balancing test to determine if disqualification is
necessary. See id. Disqualification should be used only when a trial will be tainted by use of
confidences, reduced zealousness, or disharmony. See id. at 291-95. Otherwise, the court should
award damages such as fee disgorgement or discipline. See id. at 311-12. See also Bruce A.
Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial Role, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 71 (1996)
(courts should not disqualify based on conflict of interest rules). For further discussion of such
remedies see infra text accompanying notes 124-205. Professor Morgan surveyed literature
regarding simultaneous conflicts rules and has advocated a rule prohibiting dual representation
only where the lawyer is materially limited by the conflict. Morgan, supra. Although Rule 1.7
generally contemplates only concurrent representation where clients are antagonists in a specific
matter, courts are beginning to recognize that in extreme circumstances problems may also arise
where a law firm represents competitors. See Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz,
602 A.2d 1277, 1282 (Pa. 1992). Problems may also arise where the attorney undertakes to argue
conflicting rules of law on behalf of separate clients, so-called "positional conflicts." See
generally ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-377 (1993);
John S. Dzienkowski, Positional Conflicts of Interest, 71 TEX. L. RaV. 457 (1993).
4. The lawyer has a duty to assure that the client has all information material to the client's
decision-making. See MODEL RULES, Rule 1.4. See generally Lee A. Pizzimenti, The Lawyer's
Duty to Warn Clients About Limits on Confidentiality, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 441, 471-81 (1990)
[hereinafter Pizzimenti, Duty to Warn]. Some conflicts are viewed as so serious that the lawyer
may not ask for consent and must withdraw. See MODEL RULES, Rule 1.7(a)(1) (lawyer must
reasonably believe representation will not adversely affect relationship with client); MODEL CODE,
DR 5-105(C) (must be obvious that lawyer can represent both); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW, THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 202 (Final Draft 1996) (conflict non-consentable if
prohibited by law, if one client asserts claim against another in same litigation, or circumstances
are such that it is not reasonably likely the lawyer can provide adequate representation). See

generally ANNOTATED

MODEL RULES,

Rule 1.7 (lawyer must reasonably believe that client will

not be adversely affected); Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interests in the Representation of
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In addition, she is required to keep inviolate the confidences of her
client.5 That duty continues long after the representation terminates.6
As a result, a lawyer will be disqualified for representing any interest
materially adverse to a former client if the subject matter of the new
representation is "substantially related" to the previous representation. 7
Disqualification is appropriate in such a scenario regardless of whether
confidences are actually shared, because the client might have to elabo-

rate on what confidences were disclosed in order to protect against their
disclosure.8 Thus, an irrebuttable presumption that confidences have
Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1819, 1834-35 (1996) (identifying non-consentable conflicts).
Professor Moore has observed that the Model Code does not provide much guidance regarding
adequacy of representation as a trigger for non-consentable conflicts. The balancing of client
autonomy and the lawyer's view of the client's best interest implied in the Model Rules does not
produce clear and consistent guidelines. Moore, Simultaneous Representation, supra note 3, at
220-32. Moreover, neither standard adequately protects client autonomy. See id. at 233-40. She
has proposed a standard providing that client waiver should be prohibited and decision-making
power transferred to the lawyer only when she can "reasonabl[y] assume that the clients are
incapable of rendering informed and voluntary consent." Id. at 240. To determine client
capability, clients should be asked whether they are likely to have a clear understanding of
advantages and risks of the representation, and whether the client's ability to assess the risks is
limited by psychological or economic stress. See id. For applications of her standard, see id. at
241-86.
5. See MODEL CODE, DR 4-101; MODEL RULES, Rule 1.9. There is no extended discussion
of this topic in this article since there is an extraordinary amount of scholarship in this area. See,
e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1315-34. In addition, much attention has been
paid to limitations on the responsibility of maintaining confidences in the face of conflicting
policies. See, e.g., Pizzimenti, Duty to Warn, supra note 4; Nancy J. Moore, Limits to AttorneyClient Confidentiality: A "Philosophically Informed" and ComparativeApproach to Legal and
Medical Ethics, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 177 (1985-86); Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as
Superego; Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent Harm, 70 IOWA L. REV. 1091 (1985); Fred
C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351 (1989).
6. See David Welch Co. v. Erskine & Tully, 250 Cal. Rptr. 339 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988);
MODEL RULES, Rule 1.9; ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, Rule 1.9 note (Legal Background).
7. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, Rule 1.7. Rule 1.7 essentially restates the rule developed under
Canon 4, then Canon 6, in T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265
(S.D.N.Y. 1953):
[Tihe former client need show no more than that the matters embraced within the
pending suit wherein his former attorney appears ... are substantially related to the
matters or cause of action wherein the attorney previously represented him, the
former client. The court will assume that during the course of the former
representation confidences were disclosed ....
Only in this manner can the lawyer's
duty of absolute fidelity be enforced and the spirit of the rule ... maintained.
Id. at 268-69 (quoted in Fund of Funds, 567 F.2d at 235. See generally Developments in the Law,
supra note 3, at 1315-21.
8. As the court explained in Government of India v. Cook Industries, 569 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.
1978):
On this branch of our inquiry we start with the well established principle that, in
order to grant a disqualification motion, a court should not require proof that an
attorney actually had access to or received privileged information while representing
the client in a prior case. Such a requirement would put the former client to the
Hobson's choice of either having to disclose his privileged information in order to

1997]

SCREEN VERITE

been shared arises where the matters are substantially related.9
Courts consistently have recognized that a substantial relationship
between two cases can still exist when legal claims are dissimilar, so
long as the factual issues raised by the first representation "would be
helpful in establishing . ..allegations [made in the second matter]."' 10
The Seventh Circuit has attempted to refine the standard by requiring the

court to undertake a "factual reconstruction of the scope of the prior
legal representation... [and determine] whether it is reasonable to infer
that [a client] would have ... given [confidential information] ...[that]

is relevant to the issues raised in the litigation pending against the former client."' 1
A general familiarity with a former client's financial and business
background alone is not a basis for disqualification. 2 However, courts
have recognized "the unique role that access to business thinking plays
in the context of antitrust litigation,"13 especially where counsel had an
disqualify his former attorney or having to refrain from the disqualification motion
altogether.
Id. at 740.
9. See, e.g., Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 570 (2d Cir. 1973) (quoting
T.C. Theatre Corp., 113 F. Supp. at 268-69); Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998-99 (9th Cir.
1980); Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 608 (8th Cir. 1977). See generally
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & SUSAN P. KONIAK, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 651
(David L. Shapiro et al. eds., 1990); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 368-72
(1986); ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, Rule 1.9 note (Presumption That Confidential Information
Acquired During the Prior Representation).
10. Trone, 621 F.2d at 1000. See also Kraft, Inc. v. Alton Box Bd.Co., 659 F.2d 1341, 1346
(5th Cir. 1981) (holding a substantial relationship exists where a reasonable person would find
issues "akin" in an important manner); Government of India, 569 F. 2d at 739-40 & n.1 (stating
that connection between issues must be "patently clear" but expressly affirming vitality of T.C.
Theatre); USFL v. NFL, 605 F. Supp. 1448, 1459 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding a substantial
relationship exists where facts necessary to the original representation are necessary to the
subsequent litigation). See generally ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, Rule 1.9 note (SubstantialRelationship Test). But see Crystal, supra note 3, at 315 n.3 (most courts look to whether facts are
similar, but the Second Circuit requires the relationship be "patently clear" and the Seventh
Circuit combines the approaches).
11. LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 255-56 (7th Cir. 1983). The lawyer
in La Salle was not involved in the earlier creation of the municipal sewer agreement being
challenged, but as an assistant state attorney, he was likely privy to relevant discussions about the
validity of other similar agreements. Id. at 255-57.
12. See, e.g., USFL, 605 F. Supp. at 1460. See Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646
F.2d 1339, 1351 (9th Cir. 1981) (no evidence that prior representation of prime contractor gave
lawyer special insight or advantage in unrelated case brought by subcontractors against prime);
Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 856 F.2d 98, 100-01 (9th Cir. 1988)
(lawyer had no confidential information regarding subject matter of suit; general, publicly known
information regarding distribution policies not enough).
13. Haagen-Dazs Co. v. Perche No! Gelato, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 282, 286 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
See also USFL, 605 F. Supp. at 1460 (holding knowledge of business plans, economic
organizations, prospective market position, and other such background information is particularly
relevant to antitrust litigation).
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extended relationship with the past client.14 Thus, the possibility of disqualification exists in a situation involving a close and extended relationship because a lawyer has a "greater insight and understanding of the
significance of subsequent events . ..and .. .a promising source of
discovery."1 5
Because lawyers in law firms are presumed to talk to one another,

have access to client files, and share a financial interest, most courts
have also created an irrebuttable presumption that a lawyer shares client

confidences with others in the firm. 6 Thus, all lawyers associated with
the disqualified lawyer are automatically subject to vicarious
disqualification. 17

Because a duty to protect confidences continues after the representation ends, lawyers changing firms remain vulnerable to disqualification motions that will potentially disqualify not only the lawyer, but also
her new firm. That is, all the former clients of the lawyer's old firm,

even those never represented personally by the lawyer, would potentially
be viewed as former clients of the new firm. Non-lawyer employees
who have changed firms can also trigger disqualification of a new firm.
This scenario exponentially increases the likelihood of disqualification for conflicts of interest and could result in decreased mobility for
lawyers desiring to leave large firms. In an effort to reduce the "possible

harshness" of the rule without compromising client confidences,

8

courts, following a rule articulated in Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 9 have determined that the presumption that
14. See Haagen-Dazs, 639 F. Supp. at 286-82; In re Corrogated ContainerAntitrust Litig.,
659 F. Supp. 1337, 1345-46 (5th Cir. 1981).
15. Chugach Elec. Assoc. v. United States Dist. Court, 370 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1966).
Although Chugach did not use the term "substantial relationship," it referred to the standard for
disqualifying lawyers for subsequent representation. See id. at 443. One of the earlier
articulations of the rule, Chugach is often cited as an example of a substantial relationship test.
See, e.g., Evans v. Artek Sys. Corp., 715 F.2d 788, 792 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v.
Catalanotto, 468 F. Supp. 503, 506 (D. Ariz. 1978). But see HAZARD & KONIAK, supra note 9, at
650-51 (expressing the view that Chugach is no longer the Ninth Circuit view).
16. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1321 (7th Cir.
1978). See also MODEL CODE, DR 5-105(D); MODEL RULES, Rule 1.10(a); ANNOTATED MODEL
RULES, Rule 1.10 (Legal Background); Imputed Disqualification, Lawyer's Manual on
Professional Conduct (ABA/BNA) 1 51:2005-06 (July 28, 1993). See generally WOLFRAM,
supra note 9, at 391-97, 400; Lee E. Hejmanowski, An Ethical Treatment of Attorneys' Personal
Conflicts of Interest, 66 S. CAL.L. REV. 881, 902 (1993). The Model Rules distinguish between
attorneys still at the firm and attorneys that have left the firm. Compare MODEL RULES, Rule
1.10(a) (if one attorney still at firm is disqualified then all attorneys still at firm are disqualified
without regard to whether secrets actually shared by attorneys at the firm) with id. Rule 1.9(b)
(lawyer who has left firm can rebut presumption that secrets shared) and id. Rule 1.10(b) (firm
can rebut presumption after lawyer has left firm).
17. See infra note 79.
18. Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998 n.3 (9th Cir. 1980).
19. 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
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partners share information should become rebuttable after a lawyer has
left a firm.2" That is, if the lawyer can show she actually received no
secrets of a client during her previous employment, but was only vicariously disqualified because of her former partners' representation, then
the new firm may continue representing a client whose interests diverge
from those of a client of the lawyer's former firm. The Model Rules
have adopted this point of view, finding a rigid rule to be unrealistic in
this context.2 1
As an example of how a lawyer might rebut the presumption, the
lawyer in Silver Chrysler showed that he was a relatively junior associate in the litigation department who did only peripheral research on
some procedural matters for Chrysler, while the case then pending
involved leases.2 2 Similarly, in Gas-A-Tron, the lawyer showed that
during his prior representation he performed the normal research tasks
"commonly handled by young associates in large law firms," but had not
received confidential information.2 3
An attorney who worked in a department distinct from lawyers who
had represented a client might also rebut the presumption.24 If a lawyer
cannot rebut the presumption of shared confidences, both she and her
new firm generally are disqualified.25 Such a rule has an especially
strong impact upon lateral hires from private firms or from the government who are hired for their expertise. The more experience a lawyer
has, especially when the attorney specializes in a unique area of law, the
more likely her past activities will exempt the firm from representing
clients. The result is that an experienced lawyer is more likely to be
viewed as a "Typhoid Mary"-unattractive as a new hire because of fear
her previous past client contacts will "infect," and thereby disqualify, the
entire firm. 26

20. See, e.g., Atasi Corp. v. Seagate Tech., 847 F.2d 826, 829 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Gas-A-Tron
of Ariz. v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1976). See generally WOLFRAM, supra

note 9, at 398-401.
21. See MODEL RULES, Rule 1.9(c). See id. Rules 1.9(b), 1.10(b) (adopting the rebuttable

presumption rule after a lawyer leaves a firm).
22. Silver Chrysler, 518 F.2d at 756.
23. Gas-A-Thon, 534 F.2d at 1324-5.
24. For further discussion, see ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, Rule 1.10 note (Factors Used in
Rebutting the Presumption of Shared Confidences).
25. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, Rules 1.9(b), 1.10(a); Haagen-Dazs Co., Inc. v. Perche No!
Gelato, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 282 (N.D. Cal. 1986). See generally ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, Rule
1.10 note (Traditional Rule: The Presumption of Shared Access to Confidential Information).
26. This fear was first expressed regarding government lawyers. See Kesselhaut v. United
States, 555 F.2d 791, 793 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
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THE RISING ACTION: USING SCREENS TO AVOID
DISQUALIFICATION

Concern that lawyers would not engage in public service for fear of
limiting their mobility, caused courts to allow firms to continue to represent clients even where a former government lawyer was personally disqualified if client confidences could be protected. This was allowable
only if the firm immediately "screened" the lawyer from any discussions
regarding the clients, kept the lawyer from any relevant files, and did not

share any fees from the new representation with the lawyer."

Use of a

screen in the case of government lawyers is generally accepted and has
been sanctioned by the ABA in Model Rule 1.1 128 and by the drafters of
the Restatement.2 9

Use of a screen in cases of lawyers switching from one private law
firm to another is less accepted. The Model Rules do not allow screening in the case of private firm transfer, and only four states have promulgated rules allowing it under those circumstances. 30 However, there is a
more even split of opinion among federal courts, 3 and most commenta27. See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 442-43 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc);
Kesselhaut, 555 F.2d at 793; ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
342 (1975). See generally James B. McLaren, Jr., The Future of the Chinese Wall Defense to
Vicarious Disqualificationof a Former Government Attorney's Law Firm, 38 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 151 (1981); ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, Rule 1.11 & pp. 180-92.
28. See MODEL RULES, Rule 1.11. But see Monroe Freedman, The Ethical Illusion of
Screening, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 20, 1995, at 24 (error to allow government lawyers to be
screened).
29. See supra text accompanying note 5.
30. Illinois, Michigan and Pennsylvania have promulgated rules allowing such screens. See
ILL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10; MICH. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.10; PA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10. Oregon also allows a firm to screen
lawyers leaving firms so long as all lawyers in the firm attest to their knowledge of the screen.
See OR. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(l). See generally Lawyers' Manual on

Professional Conduct (ABA/BNA),
51: 2001-14 (July 28, 1993). The American Bar
Association allows screens for temporary attorneys, see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356 (1988), and for non-lawyer employees, see ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 88-1526 (1988).
31. The Second Circuit has approved screening. See Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052 (2d
Cir. 1980), judgment vacated and appeal dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, 450 U.S. 903
(1981). Cheng appears to accept the notion of screens generally, while considering factors
requiring disqualification such as the size of the firm and the lawyer's involvement in the earlier
case. Yet, Cheng distinguishes Armstrong in part because there is a stronger public policy
regarding government lawyers' ability to find work outside the government. Compare id. at 105658, n.7. with Armstrong, 625 F.2d at 433.
The district courts in New York appear to read Cheng as allowing screens in some
circumstances. See, e.g., Marshall v. New York Div. of State Police, 952 F. Supp. 103, 111
(N.D.N.Y. 1997); Decora, Inc. v. DW Wallcovering, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 132, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1995);
Papanicolaou v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 720 F. Supp. 1080, 1086-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). The
Federal, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have accepted screening. See, e.g., Manning v.
Waring, Cox, James, Sklar and Allen, 849 F.2d 222, 225 (6th Cir. 1988); Cox v. American Cast
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tors discern no reason to distinguish the moral uprightness of government lawyers from that of private ones.32
Courts and commentators supporting the use of screens in a solely
private firm transfer cite several policies supporting their conclusion.
First, they observe that motions to disqualify are often filed for the tactical purposes of depriving the new client of long-term counsel familiar
Iron Pipe Co., 847 F.2d 725, 732 (11 th Cir. 1988); Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 421 (7th
Cir. 1983). The Federal Circuit has accepted the use of screens several times by applying the law
of other circuits even where it is inconclusive whether that circuit has adopted screens. See, e.g.,
Kennecott Corp. v. Kyocera Int'l, Inc., 899 F.2d 1228, 1990 WL 28065, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 19,
1990) (presuming the Ninth Circuit law would adopt screens); EZ Paintr Corp. v. Padco, Inc., 746
F.2d 1459, 1461-62 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (assuming the Eighth Circuit would accept timely screens);
Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (applying
Seventh Circuit law which permits screens).
Courts in the First, Third, and Ninth Circuits have explicitly left the question open. In
Kevlick v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 849 n.5 (1st Cir. 1984), the First Circuit did not consider
whether a screen would be acceptable because the law firm did not argue that there had been no
actual disclosure. In United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1204 (3d Cir. 1980), the Third
Circuit claimed it had no information enabling it to determine the efficacy of a screen on appeal.
One district court in the circuit read this to indicate, especially in light of its comments that
disqualification is within the discretion of the judge, that the Third Circuit would allow inferences
to be rebutted by use of a screen. See INA Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Rubin, 635 F. Supp. 1, 4-5
(E.D. Pa. 1983). See also Nemours Found. v. Gilbane, Aetna, Federal Ins. Co., 632 F. Supp. 418,
426 (D. Del. 1986) (observing that Miller court did not "in principle" reject screens). Although
the Ninth Circuit declined to decide the issue in Paul E. lacono Structural Eng'r, Inc. v.
Humphrey, 722 F.2d 435, 442 (9th Cir. 1983), both district courts within the Circuit and the
Federal Circuit have determined it would allow screens. See Kennecott, 899 F.2d at 1228; United
States ex rel. Lord Elec. Co. v. Titan Pac. Constr. Corp., 637 F. Supp. 1556, 1565-67 (W.D. Wash.
1986) (concluding the Ninth Circuit had not resolved the screen question, held a screen
appropriate). See also Haagen-Dazs, 639 F. Supp. at 287 (finding that the Ninth Circuit left
question open, but other courts held screening acceptable where effective). But see Elan
Transdermal Ltd. v. Cygnus Therapeutic Sys., 809 F. Supp. 1383, 1392 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
(criticizing Titan Pacific and claiming rebuttable presumptions are not California law after Paul
E. lacono). The Tenth Circuit has discussed at length the requirements of a screen but left the
question open when there are no "specific institutional mechanisms" in place. See Smith v.
Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098, 1101 (10th Cir. 1985); SLC Ltd. V v. Bradford Group West, Inc., 147
B.R. 586, 591 (Bankr. D. Utah 1992) (recognizing the exception to irrebuttable presumption when
attorney effectively screened, but screen not effective in SLC or Whatcott because screen was not
erected immediately). Neither the Fourth, Fifth nor Eighth Circuits has encountered a question of
screening in a private firm context, although the Federal Circuit assumes the Eighth Circuit would
allow screens. See EZ Paintr,746 F.2d at 1461-62.
For an excellent discussion of the federal circuit conflict regarding screens, see Randall B.
Bateman, Return to the Ethics Rules as a Standardfor Attorney Disqualification: Attempting
Consistency in Motions for Disqualificationby the Use of Chinese Walls, 33 DuQ. L. REV. 249,
268-74 (1995). See also Donald R. McMinn, ABA Formal Opinion 88-356: New Justificationfor
Increased Use of Screening Devices to Avert Attorney Disqualification,65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231,
1264-68 (1990). Because the Supreme Court has determined that disqualification motions are not
appealable, additional circuit court precedent on screens is unlikely. See infra note 92.
32. See, e.g., McMinn, supra note 31, at 1277-79; Linda Ann Winslow, Federal Courts and
Attorney DisqualificationMotions: A Realistic Approach to Conflicts of Interest, 62 WASH. L.
REV. 863, 870-72 (1987). But see infra notes 48-57.
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with his legal needs and of forcing additional expenditures to educate
new counsel. As one court concluded:
[J]udges must exercise caution not to paint with a broad brush
under the misguided belief that coming down on the side of disqualification raises the standard of legal ethics and the public's respect.
The opposite effects are just as likely-encouragement of vexacious
[sic] tactics and increased cynicism by the public.33
Second, those supporting such screens suggest that private attorneys have the same need to maintain mobility that government attorneys
do.34 Courts and commentators refer to "modem realities" and practical
factors in support of that conclusion.3
Another client-centered concern underlies the final justification for
totally private firm screens:
Not only do overly strict ethical rules restrict an attorney's employment opportunities, they restrict the availability of legal services.
Lawyers and firms will be inclined to refuse to accept representation
of smaller clients with matters that do not generate substantial fees
for fear that they would be forced to reject more lucrative representation in the future. Broadly-construed conflict of interest rules constrict the supply of services to those groups in our society that tend to
have the greatest difficulty procuring legal representation. 36
Of course, even where screens in a solely private context are con33. Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
See generally Unchanging Rules in Changing Times: The Canons of Ethics and Intra-firm
Conflicts of Interest, 73 YALE L.J. 1058, 1066-69 (1964); Winslow, supra note 32, at 871.
Professor Peterson described the harm to the present client well:
A litigant may impose both psychological hardship, by requiring his opponent
to obtain new counsel with whom he has never worked, and financial hardship, by
requiring his opponent to incur additional fees to allow his new counsel to become
familiar with the litigation.
On the other side, the client of the attacked law firm often asserts a policy of
avoiding unnecessary hardship. He has reposed trust and confidence in one law
firm to manage what may be emotionally charged litigation, and now must turn to a
different group of lawyers. He will sustain increased legal fees and loss of litigation
momentum while the new law firm becomes familiar with the case. He must also
sacrifice continuity of litigation strategy and style.
Craig A. Peterson, Rebuttable Presumptionsand Intra-Firm Screening: The New Seventh Circuit
Approach to Vicarious Disqualification of Litigation Counsel, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 399, 400401 (1984). See also McLaren, supra note 27, at 154 n.20; McMinn, supra note 31, at 1274-75;
The Chinese Wall Defense To Law-Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PENN. L. REv. 677, 679 n.ll,
(1980).
34. See McMinn, supra note 31, at 1231-35.
35. See Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar and Allen, 849 F.2d 222, 224-25 (6th Cir.
1988). The Manning court identified three such realities: there are more large law firms with
several specialists rather than solo practices and small firms; lawyers are moving more freely
among firms during their career and more firms are merging. See id. See generally McMinn,
supra note 31.

36. Titan Pac., 637 F. Supp. at 1563 n.5.
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sidered acceptable, several requirements must be met. First, rather than
an informal arrangement or mere personal resolve to maintain confi-

dences, most courts require "specific institutional mechanisms" be in
place to rebut the presumption that confidences have been or will be
shared.3 7 Courts generally find it impossible for small firms to erect
screens given the increased likelihood of interaction among attorneys.3 8

One court, expressing skepticism concerning whether a screen could be
workable in a small firm, stated: "the relatively small group of professional colleagues with whom [the lawyer] interacts on a daily basis are
also the group of people who must ... in turn, be screened from [his]
disclosure, however inadvertent. ' 39 Thus, a large firm with departmen-

tal divisions will most likely be viewed as able to maintain a screen."
Second, and more importantly, most courts4" require that a screen
be erected immediately when a lawyer joins the firm or when the firm
undertakes a new matter that potentially raises disqualification issues.4 2
37. La Salle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 259 (7th Cir. 1983). See also
Kennecott Corp., 1990 WL 28065, at *2; Whatcott, 757 F.2d at 1101; Schiessle v. Stephens, 717
F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 1983); Nelson v. Green Builders, Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1439, 1447 (E.D. Wis.
1993); Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Hallmark Dodge, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 516 (W.D. Mo. 1985); SLC
Ltd. V v. Bradford Group West, Inc., 147 B.R. 586, 591 (Bankr. D. Utah 1992); In re McLaren,
115 B.R. 922, 928 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990); In Re Chicago S. Shore and S. Bend R.R., 101 B.R.
10, 14 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989); In re Columbia Realty Assocs., Ltd., 71 B.R. 804, 810 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1987); City of Hoquiam v. Public Employment Relations Comm'n, 628 P.2d 1314, 132223 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981). But see General Elec. Co. v. Industra Prods., Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1254,
1259 (N.D. Ind. 1988) (holding that screening is one way to rebut presumption of shared
confidences, but there are others); United States ex rel. Lord Elec. Co. v. Titan Pac. Constr. Corp.,
637 F. Supp. 1556, 1565 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (holding absence of screening does not preclude
rebuttal of presumption); Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C & 0 Enters., Inc., 637 F. Supp. 1231, 1239-41
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (allowing rebuttal without screen); Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1577-78 (allowing
rebuttal of presumption by showing no confidential information actually received).
38. See, e.g., Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052, 1058 (2d Cir. 1980) (court not satisfied
that screen would be effective in small firm); Dugar v. Board of Educ., No. 92 C 1621, 1992 WL
142303, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 18, 1992); Baird v. Hilton Hotel Corp., 771 F. Supp. 24, 27
(E.D.N.Y. 1991); Weglarz v. Bruck, 470 N.E.2d 21, 25 (I11.App. Ct. 1984); Yaretsky v. Blum,
525 F. Supp. 24, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). But see Nemours Found. v. Gilbane, Aetna Federal Ins.
Co., 632 F. Supp. 418, 428-29 (D. Del. 1986) (holding size is important factor, but not
dispositive); Titan Pac., 637 F. Supp. at 1566 (allowing screen in small firm).
39. Yaretsky, 525 F. Supp. at 30.
40. See, e.g., English Feedlot, Inc., v. Norden Lab., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1498, 1587 (D. Colo.
1993); ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, Rule 1.10 note (Elements of a Screen).
41. But see Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1984), (requiring no immediate screen); Carbo Ceramics, Inc. v. Norton-Alcoa Proppants, 155
F.R.D. 158, 160, 163 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (accepting screen erected one month after lawyer joined
firm); North Am. Philips Corp. v. American Vending Sales, Inc., No. 93 C 3261, 1993 WL
473630, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 1993) (holding although lawyer hired two years previously, firm
had no reason to know of conflict until suit filed).
42. See, e.g., Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098, 1101-02 (10th Cir. 1985); Schiessle, 717
F.2d at 421; EZ Paintr Corp. v. Padco, Inc., 746 F.2d 1459, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1984); LaSalle, 703
F.2d at 259 (holding six months as untimely); Marshall v. New York Div. of State Police, 952 F.
Supp. 103, 111 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding "screening device implemented only after a disqualified
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One court reasoned:
In short, it is insufficient to remedy a conflict of interest by building a
"Chinese Wall" to screen a "tainted" attorney after the potential for
improper disclosure has existed. Once Pandora's Box has been
opened, the ethical malaise which may have escaped cannot be
treated by nailing a plank over the open vessel.43

Thus, the screen must be erected as soon as the potentially disqualifying event occurs, not later when a motion is filed or a court finds a

disqualifying conflict.
Cases that discuss the general elements of an acceptable screen typ-

ically require a firm to segregate both paper and computer files, inform
lawyers in the firm about the screen, and preclude fee sharing from the
screened case to reduce monetary incentive to share confidences. 44
Some courts have also required or noted with approval the requirement
of all lawyers signing affidavits indicating they will abide by a screen.45
Some courts have suggested that screens are particularly problematic in
lawyer has been with a finn" not adequate); Decora, Inc. v. DW Wallcovering, Inc., 899 F. Supp.
132, 140-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (rejecting a screen implemented after motion to disqualify was
filed); Nelson, 823 F. Supp. at 1451 (holding screen was at least one year late); Isidor Paiewonsky
Assocs., Inc. v. Sharp Properties, Inc., Civ. a. No. 87-44, 1990 WL 303427, at *8 (D.V.I. Apr. 6,
1990) (holding two years untimely); Papanicolaou v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 720 F. Supp.
1080, 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (rejecting a screen implemented after motion filed); Haagen-Dazs
Co. v. Perche No! Gelato, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 282, 287 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (holding screen erected
one year after attorney hired and two months after lawsuit filed was untimely); SLC Ltd., 147 B.R.
at 591; In re Davenport Communications Ltd. Partnership, 109 B.R. 362, 367 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa
1990). But see Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1581 (requiring no immediate screen); Carbo Ceramics, 155
F.R.D. at 160, 163 (accepting screen erected one month after lawyer joined firm); North Am.
Philips, 1993 WL 473630 at *6 (holding although lawyer was hired two years previously, firm
had no reason to know of conflict until suit was filed).
43. SLC Ltd., 147 B.R. at 592.
44. See, e.g., Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar and Allen, 849 F.2d 222, 226 (6th Cir.
1988) (explaining court should consider size and structure of firm, likelihood of contact with
disqualified attorney, access to files and fee sharing); Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098, 1101
(10th Cir. 1985); Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1267-68 (7th Cir. 1983);
Nelson, 823 F. Supp. at 1447-48; Hutnick v. Inland Steel Co., No. 86 C 2567, 1987 WL 9003, at
*4 (N.D. I11.Mar. 27, 1987); Henriksen v. Great Am. Sav. and Loan, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 188 n.6
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992); In re McLaren, 115 B.R. 922, 928-29 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990); In re
Chicago S. Shore and S. Bend R.R., 101 B.R. 10, 14 (Bankr. N.D. I11.1989); In re Columbia
Realty Assocs., Ltd.,'71 B.R. 804, 809 (Bankr. N.D. I11.1987); In re GHR Energy Corp., 60 B.R.
52, 66 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985); Employers Ins. v. Albert D. Seeno Constr. Co., 692 F. Supp.
1150, 1154 n.17 (N.D. Cal. 1988). See generally ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, Rule 1.10 note
(Elements of a Screen); Susan R. Martyn, Visions of the Eternal Law Firm: The Future of Law

Firm Screens, 45 S.C. L. REV. 937 (1994).
45. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lord Elec. Co. v. Titan Pac. Constr. Corp., 637 F. Supp.
1556, 1566-67 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (requiring all lawyers at firm to file assurances with court that
they will screen disqualified lawyer); NFC, Inc. v. General Nutrition, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 332, 336
(D. Mass. 1983) (requiring affidavits and declarations). See also OR. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILTY DR 5-105(l)(1), (2) (requires affidavits from screened lawyer and firm member
that lawyer and all firm members will abide by screen).
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cases that were pending when the lawyer joined the new firm, and have
not allowed them.4 6 Assuming that such protections are in place, those
supporting the use of screens assert that their governing bar should trust
that most lawyers are honest and should discipline those who are not,
rather than adopting a blanket rule against screens.4 7
Those opposing such use of screens point out differences between
government and private firm practices. Concern that lawyers will be

discouraged from public service is a stronger policy argument than is
mere "attorney mobility."48 Moreover, information that government
lawyers possess is generally less "private" in light of the Freedom of
Information Act and other statutes allowing public access to government
information.49 As a result, many courts have concluded that erection of
a screen in private firm cases, even assuming attorney integrity, is inappropriate." In their view, client and public suspicions cannot be put to
46. See, e.g., Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052, 1058 (2d Cir. 1980) (explaining one factor
supporting disqualification is the new firm is currently pursuing same action lawyer was exposed
to at prior firm); Baird v. Hilton Hotel Corp., 771 F. Supp. 24, 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating danger
of disclosure continues where case ongoing); In re McLaren, 115 B.R. 922, 927 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1990) (explaining wall inappropriate in ongoing case). See also The Chinese Wall Defense
to Law-Firm Disqualification,128 U. PENN. L. REV. 677, 712 (1980) (showing relevancy of time
lapse between matters since likelihood for recollection of confidences is greater, files are more
likely available and the likelihood of breach higher with recent representation); Howard M.
Liebman, The Changing Law of Disqualification: The Role of Presumption and Policy, 73 N.W.
L. REV. 996, 1016 (1979). See generally ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, Rule 1.10 note (Elements of
a Screen). For a discussion of additional requirements, see infra text accompanying notes 108122.
47. See, e.g., Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d
Cir. 1975). See generally James Lindgren, Toward a New Standard of Attorney Disqualification,
1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 419 (1982).
48. See, e.g., Henriksen, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 184 (holding vicarious disqualification rule only
unduly harsh regarding government attorneys); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Petrin, 516 So. 2d 6,
7 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) ("hardship of recruiting attorneys in the private sector is not an overriding
problem"); Lansing-Delaware Water Dist. v. Oak Lane Park, Inc., 808 P.2d 1369, 1377 (Kan.
1991) (noting that ABA considered screens in private context and rejected them). In Cheng v.
GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1980), the court distinguished Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625
F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980), by stating:
In Armstrong we noted the absence of a threat of taint of the underlying trial, and
cited several policy reasons for approving the screening employed there. Primary
among these reasons was a recognition that to disallow screening in all cases
involving government attorneys might hamper the "government's efforts to hire
qualified attorneys." 625 F.2d at 443. In the instant case, by contrast, there does
exist a threat of taint of the underlying trial, but there are no public policy reasons
against disqualification as compelling as those involved in Armstrong.
631 F.2d at 1058 n.7. See also Thomas D. Morgan, Screening the Disqualified Lawyer: The
Wrong Solution to the Wrong Problem, 10 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J. 37, 49-50 (1988); Memorandum to A.L.I. Council Regarding Adoption of § 204, at 14-15 [hereinafter ALl Memorandum]
(on file with author).
49. See Morgan, supra note 48, at 52.
50. See, e.g., Amoco Chem. Corp. v. D.C. MacArthur, 568 F. Supp. 42, 47 (N.D. Ga. 1983);
Roberts v. Hutchins, 572 So. 2d 1231, 1234 n.3 (Ala. 1990); Towne Dev. of Chandler, Inc. v.
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rest by using a screen. Given that only the lawyers seeking to avoid
disqualification have access to facts proving the screen is maintained,
"in the end, the public has no way of knowing whether a breach in the
[screen] might ever occur. "51
Given the reduced weight of the arguments in favor of private
screens and the increased likelihood that information retained is sensitive, courts and some commentators find that private screens simply are
not worth the risk. Leaving intentional breaches aside, it is viewed as
impossible to protect against inadvertent disclosure of information, especially "soft" information such as general knowledge regarding company
practices and policies.5 Moreover, screening becomes increasingly
more difficult to control where "multiple lawyers in multiple office
megafirms are being screened from multiple matters over a number of
years, requiring an elaborate matrix, perhaps even a computer program,
to sort out which lawyers are screened from what engagements. 53 In
addition, these commentators observe that few courts have carefully
articulated minimum requirements for a successful screen. 54 Also, they
argue, financial incentive to disclose information remains even where
the attorney may not directly share in fees, because a victory for the new
client is generally beneficial to the firm.55
Opponents to screens also point out that it is difficult to avoid client
harm when the screen is breached. Former clients could be harmed yet
never know of a breach. Clients suspecting a breach may be forced to
disclose confidences to a judge in order to prove a breach has
occurred 56-the very course of action for which courts created irrebuttable presumptions to avoid. Worse, disclosures to the new client rather
than merely to another lawyer may occur and would be impossible to
Superior Court, 842 P.2d 1377, 1381-82 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); DeBartolo, 516 So. 2d at 6;
Lansing-Delaware,808 P.2d at 1377.

51. Petroleum Wholesale, Inc. v. Marshall, 751 S.W.2d 295, 301 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988). See
also State ex rel. Freezer Servs., Inc. v. Mullen, 458 N.W.2d 245 (Neb. 1990) (stating that through

rule prohibiting screen the parties and public can be assured that confidences will be protected
from intentional or inadvertent disclosure); WOLFRAM, supra note 9, at 402 ("In the end there is
little but the self-serving assurance of the screening-lawyer foxes that they will carefully guard the
screened-lawyer chickens."); see Freedman, supra note 28 (temptations to violate confidences are
high; violations are impossible to police or prove).

52. See Morgan, supra note 48, at 48-49 (relative informality of information exchanged
within firm makes breach likely); ALl Memorandum, supra note 48, at 9-10 (information
inadvertently transmitted because of atmosphere that anything can be said out loud because it will

be kept confidential in a law firm). Courts have held that confidential information triggering
disqualification includes not only facts regarding a specific case, but general information
concerning a client that could be used to his detriment. See supra text accompanying notes 12-15.
53. ALl Memorandum, supra note 48, at 9.
54. See, e.g., id. at 12.

55. See Morgan, supra note 48, at 48.
56. See ALI Memorandum, supra note 48, at 13.
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correct.5 7
The intensity of this debate is reflected in the history of discussions
regarding screens within the ALI in connection with its proposed
Restatement. An earlier draft of section 204 allowed screening only in
the case of government attorneys. After extensive debate, the ALI director was asked to appoint a sub-committee to consider alternative
approaches to screening." The final draft of section 204 allows screening for lawyers who have moved from a private firm only where:
[T]here is no reasonable prospect that confidential information of the
former client will be used with material adverse effect on the former
client because:
a) the confidential client information ... is not likely to be signifi-

cant...
b) adequate screening procedures are in effect... ; and

c) timely and adequate notice of the screening has been provided. 9
Comments following the rule clarify that screening will be allowed
only where the lawyer had no contact or minimal contact with client
confidences while at the first firm. Silver Chrysler arguably already
covers such cases6" and the Restatement would clearly allow screens in
only a small number of cases. 6 However, as one advisor to the Restatement observed: "This section amounts to a foot in the door to expand
law which so far has been less sympathetic to the practitioner's view
point ... ."62

Despite the adopted rule, it is clear the screening issue remains
unresolved. As the Reporter explains in remarks to the Council, issued
prior to adoption of the rule, "[d]espite the fact that only one version
comes back to the Council, there remains a difference of view whether
the limited screening provided for in the Reporter's proposal is preferable to the more expansive screening that at least some sub-committee
members prefer. That choice seems to be the principal issue for the
57. See id. at 11.
58. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW, THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, Reporter's
Memorandum (Council Draft No. 6 1991), at xxii-xxiii [hereinafter Reporter's Memorandum].
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW, THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 204 (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1 1996) (emphasis added).
60. See supra text accompanying notes 18-24.
61. This approach is advocated by Professor Morgan. See Morgan, supra note 48, at 51-53.
The limited acceptance of screens is consistent with an earlier draft of the Model Rules, which
was rejected in favor of a rule totally prohibiting screens in the private firm setting. Compare
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 7.1 (discussion draft) with MODEL RULES, Rule
1.11. See also Nemours Found. v. Gilbane, Aetna, Fed. Ins. Co., 632 F. Supp. 418 (D. Del. 1986)
(adopting rule that screen appropriate where representation peripheral).
62. Symposium Question and Answer Session, Symposium: The Evolving Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers, 46 OKLA. L. REv. 91, 92 (1993) (comments of Susan R. Martyn)
[hereinafter Q and A].
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Of course, there were some members of the Council who

disagreed with the notion of any screen, claiming that clients might have
to disclose information to prove that disclosure will have a "material
adverse effect"
because the confidential information provided was
"significant.' 6

IV.

THE CLIMAX:

THE ACADEMIC MEETS THE PRACTITIONER

Two questions arise in the controversy about screens. The first is a
sociological one: are lawyers generally princes or knaves? Will they
scheme to extract every advantage they can, or are they constrained by
morality and professional honor? Allusions to each of these archetypes
abound in discussions regarding screens.65
The second is the practical question: assuming lawyers want to do
the right thing and protect client rights, can they? Or are effective
screens an impossibility?
Like everyone else considering the topic, I had an opinion regarding the answers to those questions: some lawyers and some screens
would be flawed, but the adversarial system could take care of cases
where breaches occurred. Antagonists could conclude from the course
of discovery that information had been shared and would take necessary
steps, such as filing disqualification motions, to resolve problems.
It occurred to me that my opinions were one part amateur psychology and one part conjecture, and so I solicited information from those
63. Reporter's Memorandum, supra note 58, at 23. For further description of the debate, see
Susan R. Martyn, Conflict About Conflicts: The Controversy Concerning Law Firm Screens, 46
OKLA. L. REV. 53 (1993).
64. ALI Memorandum, supra note 48, at 13. See also Q and A, supra note 62, at 94-95
(vague standard invites self interested lawyer to assume information not significant). Although
section 204 has been cited in a few cases, it has not yet made a great impact. See, e.g., Cardona v.
General Motors Corp., 942 F. Supp. 968, 977 (D.N.J. 1996) (citing section 204 but noting that
New Jersey does not accept the rule); Roberts & Schaefer Co. v. San-Con, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 356,
362-63 (S.D. W. Va. 1995) (citing section 204 but expressing concern with trend to liberalize
disqualification rule); Elan Transdermal Ltd. v. Cygnus Therapeutic Sys., 809 F. Supp. 1383,
1391 n.14 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (refusing to consider tentative draft of section 204 as it does not
reflect California law); Towne Dev. of Chandler, Inc. v. Superior Court, 842 P.2d 1377, 1382
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (citing section 204 but finding that it conflicts with intent of the drafters of
the Arizona rules).
65. Compare, e.g., In re Chicago S. Shore and S. Bend R.R., 101 B.R. 10, 15 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1989) (stating there is every right to assume that lawyers will be honorable and adhere to
screening procedures); Rivera v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., No. 51 63 64, 1991 WL 151892, at
*6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 1991) ("court must presume that plaintiffs' counsel will scrupulously
comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct") and Nemours, 632 F. Supp. at 428 ("credit
members of the legal profession with a certain level of integrity") with Cardona, 942 F. Supp. at
977-78 (adopting Wolfram's "fox and chickens" analogy) and Papanicolaou v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 720 F. Supp. 1080, 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("in the course of litigation both scuttlebutt and
official information travel quickly by word of mouth").
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erecting and maintaining screens. A questionnaire was prepared and
mailed to management partners at 156 firms comprised of fifty lawyers
or more in Michigan, Illinois, Pennsylvania and Oregon. Those states
were chosen because their state supreme courts had promulgated rules
allowing screens in the private firm context. Firms with over fifty lawyers were selected because, Nemours66 notwithstanding, most courts are
hesitant to allow screens in firms smaller than that.67
The goal in crafting the questions was to discover several things.
Did the firms take professional responsibility generally, and screens specifically, seriously? Did they know the law regarding conflicts and
screens? Did they do a good job of getting the information necessary to
detect conflicts? Did they have policies to assure compliance with
screen requirements and to discourage breaches? Finally, did they
believe they could spot violations committed by opposing firms?
Only twenty percent of the firms questioned sent a response, 68 making it difficult to state that the results received hold true for all large
firms, let alone for smaller firms. It may be that those firms most aware
of and organized to respond to ethics issues participated. The results do,
however, provide some insight into how screens are constructed and
maintained, raising both hope and concerns.
A review of the survey results revealed that law firms do vigorously attempt to avoid conflicts. However, they are hampered in this
effort by insufficient legal and factual information. In addition, it
appears that their ability to analyze such issues may be hampered by
approaching issues from an adversarial viewpoint, or simply by their
personal conflicting interests.
A.

General Information and Conflicts Identification Systems

Most hopeful is that the firms appear to take ethics seriously. Of
those firms responding, 83.4% had presented in-house continuing legal
education (CLE) regarding professional responsibility issues within the
last two years; 83.4% of their attorneys had attended outside CLE on
such matters during that period.69 Virtually all the firms have extensive
resources on professional responsibilities in their libraries.7 ° Sixty-one
66. Nemours, 632 F. Supp. at 418.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.

68. Two reasons for this spring to mind. First, the questionnaire sought sensitive information.
Second, and possibly more importantly, time spent on this questionnaire could not be billed to a
client. The questionnaire was twenty-five pages long and could easily have taken over an hour to
complete. I was extremely grateful to those law firms concerned enough about this issue to take
the time to respond.
69. This may be a result of CLE being mandatory in those jurisdictions.
70. When asked what resources were available at the firm, one respondent provided the
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percent have members in their firm who are involved in activities of the
organized bar dealing with ethics, discipline, or professionalism. Moreover, the firms seem to recognize the importance of having expertise
regarding ethics matters within the firm: 79.6% have a partner in charge
of reviewing conflicts, and 70.4% have standing ethics committees.
However, only 27% of such committees meet on a regular rather than on
an ad hoc basis.
Finally, the firms have a well developed system for detecting conflicts. One hundred percent of those firms questioned consult a client
index, while 83.4% also circulate a memorandum before new matters are
accepted. Virtually all firms indicated that new files could not be

opened without such a review, and that they distributed a written policy
outlining the procedures. Only 6% apparently have no requirement that

someone other than the lawyer wishing to open the file aid in resolving a
conflict.
The problem is that the information discovered during a conflicts
check can only be as good as the information that is entered in the system. Virtually all firms include the name of the client, opposing parties

and counsel, and co-plaintiffs and defendants. These are, however,
potentially disqualifying omissions. For example, while courts have disqualified lawyers for representing parties whose interests conflict with
an entity related to a former client, 7 ' 22.4% of responding firms did not

include such information in their conflicts data banks. Courts have disqualified firms for representing parties because of a conflict with

frightening answer that the firm had "just the Code." It is hard to imagine a tax lawyer saying that
one could find "just the Code" in her law firm library. Another respondent pinpoints a significant
problem regarding doing research on professional responsibility: "[W]e have about twenty
treatises in our main library, all of which are terribly indexed." (emphasis in original).
71. See, e.g., Decora, Inc. v. DW Wallcovering, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 132, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(lawyer disqualified in suit against subsidiary for past related representation of parent company);
Strategem Dev. Corp. v. Heron Int'l N.V., 756 F. Supp. 789, 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (law firm
disqualified for simultaneously representing a subsidiary and pepapring to file suit against the
parent company); Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 534, 53940 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (past representation of subsidiary may require disqualification in action
against parent); Teradyne, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. C-91-0344 MHP ENE, 1991 WL
239940, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 1991) (lawyer disqualified in suit against parent company
because of representation of subsidiary and parent's benefit plans). See also Pennwalt v. Plough,
85 F.R.D. 264, 271 (D. Del. 1980) (lawyer not disqualified but court recognized potential conflict
when sister corporations share board members and personnel). The American Bar Association, in
a divided opinion, rejected a per se rule requiring disqualification for same-firm representation of
related corporate entities. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 95-390 (1995). See generally Ronald D. Rotunda, Conflicts Problems When Representing
Members of Corporate Families, 72 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 655 (1997) (rejecting cases advocating
per se rule requiring disqualification because of adverse impact on profits alone); Morgan, supra
note 3, at 1191-93 (discussing ABA Formal Opinion 95-390).
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officers, directors, or partners; 72 yet, 51.2% did not list officers, while
57.6% did not list directors.
Of equal concern is the accuracy of information contained in the
index. Of those firms responding, 28.8% do not update information
included in the index.
The next set of questions related to how information regarding individual lateral hires or mergers was handled. Ninety-six percent
responded that they solicited information regarding matters that lawyers
personally handled prior to joining the firm and resolved any conflicts
before employment commenced, which is a wise approach. Again, however, there were serious deficiencies in the content of information elicited. All firms asked the lawyers about matters on which they were
currently working; 97% asked about matters on which they previously
worked and were currently ongoing. However, 51% did not ask lawyers
about matters the lawyer previously worked on which were no longer
pending. Given the large number of cases involving disqualification due
to past client conflicts, this omission seems to ask for trouble.7 3

When firms were asked what they did when the information provided by laterals was not related to any case currently pending in the
firm, only 28.6% indicated they would enter the information into their
computer bank. Again, given the potential for a later conflict, this seems
like a risky approach.
Moreover, firms generally asked for less information from lateral
hires than they required to be included in their general conflicts indices. 74 Firms also varied regarding whether they asked questions about
the nature of the work performed, 75 despite the focus in many cases on
the extent of the lawyer's responsibility and access to confidential information in prior representation.76 It is possible that those firms that
72. See, e.g., Evans v. Artek Sys. Corp., 715 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1983) (case remanded to
determine whether past representation was of corporation or officer).
73. See supra notes 7-26 and accompanying text. Of course, it will be difficult for lawyers,
especially senior lawyers, to reconstruct all of their past client relationships. However, lawyers

will likely remember those cases in which they had major roles, which will at least reduce the
likelihood of later disqualification. Perhaps a computer-generated client list from billing records
could be compiled.

74. Of those responding, 42% did not ask for names of related corporate or partnership
entities; 77% did not ask names of partners/corporate officers; 87.5% did not request the names of
directors; 21% did not request co-plaintiff names, while 56% did not ask about co-defendants.

75. 1 asked which questions, if any, firms asked lawyers regarding their roles in matters. The
answers, with percentages indicating firms that did not ask, were as follows: did lawyer supervise
(29.6%); access to client documents (33.3%); access to client information (33.3%); meetings with

client (59.2%); meetings with other lawyers (62.9%); work "on the merits" (44.4%); work limited
to procedural matters (66.6%); and work limited to general research (55%).
76. See, e.g., Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052, 1056-57 (2d Cir. 1980) (no
disqualification where associate had peripheral role); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler
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refrain from asking such questions assume that any work performed in a
prior representation would automatically disqualify a lawyer;77 if not, a
firm would be wise to investigate such matters.7 8

Some firms that do not elicit complete information take one additional risk. Despite several cases indicating that disqualification can be
triggered by non-lawyer employees,7 9 50% of those responding did not

ask for information from new lawyers who may have worked with other
firms while in law school; 44.8% did not ask paralegals; 72.6% did not
ask secretaries or other support staff; and 56.1% did not ask law
students.

Firms clearly have systems in place for identifying conflicts. Many
have well designed systems which reduce the likelihood of surprise.
Many, however, simply do not solicit all the information they need to
protect themselves from discovering a conflict much later than they or
their clients should.
B.

Awareness of Law Regarding Conflicts

The next set of questions was designed to provide insight into
whether respondents were familiar with the law regarding conflicts generally and screens in particular. I provided them with several hypothetical situations and asked what their firm policy dictates. In each
situation, the firm had several options, none of which were exclusive.
For example, the first question in this set was as follows:
12. Assume a new hire discloses that he/she worked on a matter for a
client whose interests are adverse to those of a client who the
firm currently represents regarding the same matter.
Is it firm policy to: (CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY)
a. Withdraw from representation of current client?
Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 756-57 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding screen inappropriate where lawyer as
senior legal services attorney participated in discussions); Nemours Found. v. Gilbane, Aetna,
Fed. Ins., 632 F. Supp. 418, 425 (D. Del. 1986) ("rigid [disqualification] rule exaggerates the
difference between a partner and an associate in modem law firms").
77. A small percentage of respondents did indicate that they assumed the lawyer had an active
role. Given the number of law firms indicating later in the survey that they resolved conflicts
matters on a case-by-case basis (as do many courts), more firms should ask these clearly relevant
questions.
78. Some respondents indicated great sensitivity to this issue. I asked whether a firm would
ask additional questions about potential conflicts. One response: "Take depositions? Appear in
court? Knowledge of a former client's businesses practices if relevant to a perceived conflict?"
This is a person who understands conflicts issues. See supra text accompanying notes 18-24.
79. See, e.g., Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C & 0 Enters., Inc., 637 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. I11.1985)
(secretary/office manager); Phoenix Founders, Inc. v. Marshall, 887 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. 1994)
(paralegal). See generally ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, Rule 1.10 note (Imputation Due to
Nonlawyer Employees); Stephen E. Kalish, The Side-Switching Staff Person in a Law Firm:
Uncomplimentary Assumptions and an Ethics Curtain, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 35 (1991).
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YES NO
b. "Screen" new hire from giving or receiving any information regarding the matter and continue representation of
current client?
YES NO
c. Continue representation of the client without use of a
screen?
YES NO
d. Make a case-by-case determination regarding whether a
screen is advisable?
YES NO
IF SO, please briefly explain what factors are considered in
making that determination and who makes that
determination.
e. Ask new hire's former client for permission to continue
representation of the firm's current client?
YES NO
f. Proceed only with former client's permission?

YES NO
g. Follow another course of action not described above?
YES NO
IF SO, please describe.
Respondents were provided with the same set of options for each
hypothetical.
Responses to the first question were consistent. Ninety-three percent stated they would erect a screen in cases where an attorney had
previously worked on the currently pending case when affiliated with
another firm. In fact, 35.2% said that they would require both a screen
and former client consent, and 6.4% of those responding said they simply would withdraw under these circumstances.
Equally positive were responses to issues regarding past representations. I initially asked firms to assume that a new hire worked on a case
no longer pending but factually related to a matter currently pending in
the firm. Only 6.6% of those responding would continue representing
the client without a screen; each of these firms would at least evaluate
the matter on a case-by-case basis.8 0
More intriguing were responses to the question concerning what a
firm would do if it learned a lawyer had represented, while at another
firm, a client whose interests conflict with those of the firm's current
client and about whom the lawyer has "general knowledge" of person80. Approximately 65% recognized they could not maintain a screen and continue to
represent a client without permission; another 26% would at least evaluate the matter on a "case
by case" basis. Only 76% of those responding indicated they would simply continue the

representation.
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nel, policies, and procedures. Although 30% of those responding would
not erect a screen, all but one would at least analyze the matter on a
case-by-case basis. The comments reflected a real sensitivity regarding
this issue. One respondent indicated the hypothetical represented a
"'smell test' judgment call, but we would tend to screen if there was any
doubt." Others concurred, citing several factors. As one respondent
stated, "judgment is made concerning the significance of the 'general
knowledge,' confidentiality of general knowledge, and nature of pending
matter (e.g., contentious or not)." Another considered the following factors: "Nature of new hire's involvement; level of sophistication of clients; evaluate public nature of new hire's information/knowledge;
amount of time since new hire's involvement." These considerations
echo concerns voiced by courts when considering the issue of general
knowledge.8" It is encouraging that such careful evaluation appears to
be occurring.
Similarly, most lawyers seem to understand the rule that lawyers
may not concurrently represent clients whose interests are adverse.
Ninety-four percent would either simply withdraw or continue only with
both clients' permission. Moreover, some explicitly raised the point that
the lawyer must independently evaluate whether she can represent both,
even with client consent. As one respondent stated, "some conflicts
simply can't be waived. If this is one of those, we would withdraw from
both sides."82
C.

Creating Screens

I am less sanguine about responses concerning when screens should
be erected. I asked what the firm would do upon discovering a conflict
after the lawyer joins the firm but before a motion to disqualify is filed.
Given the spotty information provided in conflicts checks, 83 this is not
an unlikely problem for firms to confront. As indicated above, courts
generally indicate that a screen should be erected immediately upon a
lawyer joining the firm or new matter coming to the firm. Yet, only
81. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
82. Another indicated that if the "matter were directly adverse, we would most likely

withdraw from representing either," and one stated "one must determine if the representation is on
the same or a related matter so that one can determine whether the conflcit can be waived." Cf.,

MODEL CODE, DR 5-105(D) (must be "obvious" that firm can represent both and must get
consent); MODEL RULES, Rule 1.7(a) (attorney must reasonably conclude that representation will
not be affected and must get consent). In an effort to avoid skewing the results, I did not directly
ask whether lawyers performed such an analysis; I asked the less direct question of what factors
are considered in making a determination about the representation. Thus, I cannot, unfortunately,
say what percentage of respondents understood the requirements to be part of the rule. Several did

raise the issue, however.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 74-79.
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7.6% would withdraw; 65% would proceed with a screen without former
clients' permission.84
Perhaps more alarming, 52% of those responding indicated they
would evaluate the appropriateness of a screen on a case-by-case basis.
Given that I told them the clients' interests were adverse and that the
matters were related, it is unclear what factors are left to evaluate. Two
respondents indicated they would consider the extent of the associate's
involvement in the prior case, which is fair given the peripheral representation rule.85 However, 10% indicated the issue was whether comoccurred, which clearly is not the standard for
munication had actually
86
disqualification.
Similarly, only 13.8% would withdraw if the firm learns of the conflict when a motion to disqualify is filed. In fact, 9.2% would continue
without implementing a screen. Again, several lawyers cite actual sharing of information as the standard. An interesting question is whether
the decision to continue is made because changing the approach when a
motion is filed is similar to subsequent repairs following an accident:
both suggest an admission of lack of due care.87 Here, 50% say they
would proceed only with the former client's consent. Why would a
larger number respond only if and when a motion has been filed (when
the former client is likely not to be in a conciliatory mood)? Are some
firms setting up screens late hoping they do not get caught? Or do they
miss the conflict until the opposing side raises the issue?
Some general conclusions can be drawn concerning knowledge and
application of conflicts law. The majority of firms responding are generally aware of the rules. The consistent minority who are not, however,
is troubling since it is expected that large firms face such issues often
and therefore should know the law. Moreover, the fact that these firms
took the time to reply indicates a greater than average concern regarding
these issues. That such firms do not follow the conflicts rules does not
bode well for compliance by others. However, this concern should not
be overstated given that many firms are aware of requirements.
What accounts, then, for the broad unwillingness to withdraw when
a conflict is discovered after representation begins? Obviously, there is
84. Requiring consent from both clients is a wise approach given the courts' reluctance in
concurrent conflict cases to allow a firm to avoid conflict by choosing which client it wishes to
keep and dropping the other like a "hot potato." See, e.g., Picker Int'l, Inc. v. Varian Assocs., 869
F.2d 578, 583 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (firm may not simply choose among clients with conflicting
interests). See generally ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, Rule 1.9 note (The Hot-Potato Client).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 18-25.

86. See supra text accompanying notes 37-41.
87. The concern for prejudicial effect of such action lies behind the subsequent repair rule.
See FED. R. EvID. 407.
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loss of revenue for the firm. This provides incentive to advocate
strongly on behalf of continuing the representation, especially in light of
the fact that disqualification motions are sometimes filed for tactical reasons.88 I should note, however, that my questions made clear that a conflict did exist, so the concern the motion was filed for tactical reasons
should not have been a consideration. It may be that the reason for
reluctance to withdraw is the inclination towards advocacy: if possible,

an argument should be made to convince the judge to rule favorably.
Given the current state of the law, this is not an irrational response.
Many cases stress the need for flexibility in reviewing disqualification
motions.89 Although most cases hold that screens must be erected
immediately upon the hire or the event creating the conflict, 90 some

courts allow some leeway. 9' Moreover, enough courts have been willing to depart from mainstream thought regarding ethical issues that
attorneys can frequently find some case to cite in opposition to a disqualification motion.9 2

Further, it may be that because most conflicts are unintended, law
88. See, e.g., Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 722 (7th Cir. 1982);
In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 470 F. Supp. 495, 503 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (holding
strategic use of disqualification motions justifies flexibility in rules); Anchor Packing Co. v. ProSeal, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1215, 1223 (E.D. Mich. 1988) ("seems far more possible for tactical
considerations to be at issue" when motion filed after litigation has begun); ANNOTATED MODEL
RULES, Rule 1.9 note (Use and Abuse of Motions to Disqualify); see also supra note 33 and
accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1577 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (balancing right to counsel with ethical standards); Freeman, 689 F.2d at 721
(disqualification is drastic measure).
90. See supra text accompanying note 43.
91. See supra note 41.
92. Several cases have either gotten the law wrong or have made very odd comments. In
Salamon v. Messina, No. 87 C 2097, 1989 WL 6502, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 25, 1989), the plaintiff
consulted a lawyer regarding recovery of sales commissions. The attorney declined representation
of plaintiff, but later his firm represented defendants in the action against plaintiff. The court did
not disqualify the firm where the attorney was a partner because it concluded the lawyer's earlier
advice to the plaintiff was not a "confidential communication." Id. at *4. In Donohoe v.
ConsolidatedOperating & Prod.Corp., 691 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. I11.1988), the court found that the
information obtained in the prior representation was not highly probative, yet the court still felt it
necessary to comment that "[b]y the time [the motion to disqualify was filed, the attorney]
assuredly had ample opportunity to use or disclose to his clients any confidential information he
might have had. That calls into question whether any purpose might be served by disqualifying
[the firm]." Id. at 118. In INA UnderwritersIns. Co. v. Rubin, 635 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1983), the
court approved a screen although the lawyer never switched firms and the conflict involved
representation in the same case. However, the Court may have been influenced by the appearance
that the plaintiff might have deliberately attempted to create a conflict. See id. at 6. As Professor
Rotunda has observed, there has been a dearth of appellate opinions since the Supreme Court held
denials of motions to disqualify unappealable in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S.
368 (1981). See Rotunda, supra note 71, at 665. Rotunda refers to the result as a "death of
precedent" in attorney disqualification cases, which provides too much unreviewable discretion to
judges and too little guidance to lawyers. Id. at 666-68.
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firms caught in them tend genuinely to believe they can be resolved in
good faith without loss of the firm's valuable services. In so doing, they
may tend to underestimate the intensity of the conflict or sensitivity of
information. 9
The problem with adopting an adversarial stance in such a case is
that it is adopted not in opposition to a typical adversary, but instead
against a former client, to whom the lawyer owes fiduciary duties.
Thus, a more objective, less self-serving, and less adversarial approach
is required of lawyers analyzing screen issues. Rather than determining
whether any argument can be made, the lawyer should recognize the
conflict of interest and resolve the matter in a manner consistent with
fiduciary responsibilities. 94
D. Maintaining Screens

Assuming that continued representation using a screen is appropriate, the question becomes whether firms do an adequate job in erecting
and maintaining screens. Many do, but a significant minority do not.
One law firm describes a preferred approach: "[We provide a] monthly
reminder of our firm policy, which is also contained in our policy manual. [There is an] annual certification by each partner and employee of
compliance with the policy, [and we conduct] periodic seminars."
Unfortunately, not enough firms follow this example. Only 35.2%
have written policy statements on the topic, though it is assumed most
lawyers would probably advise their clients to commit their employment
policies to writing to reduce confusion. Twenty-five percent have
neither a written or oral policy. None has articulated a firm policy for
sanctions if a screen is breached.95 Moreover, only 47.6% of those
responding indicate that they conduct seminars or otherwise provide
information about the proper functioning of screens.
In addition, a substantial minority do not seem to be clear on what
is required. While 94.5% state they segregate files, 20% of those
responding do not have effective policies for limiting access. Representative comments include that "access is available to anyone," "access is
not limited except by oral pronouncement," and that access is limited
only by the "honor system." Moreover, 43% indicated they do not segregate computer files containing client documents. One firm responds it
would lock files in "severe" cases. Query whether past clients would
93. See infra text accompanying note 104.
94. See infra text accompanying notes 177-78, 201-05.
95. One respondent did indicate, however, that "there is a general policy that breaches of firm
policies will not be tolerated and remedial action will be taken."

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:305

feel comfortable with such a system, or whether courts are likely to
approve.
Of course, an honor system cannot work unless there is assurance
that lawyers and staff are continually aware of the screen. While 92.4%
of those responding inform lawyers and staff working on the case of the
screen's existence, 25.2% are informed orally or learn of it only if they
see a file that has a file label restricting access. There is plenty of opportunity for inadvertent disclosure before notification occurs with such a
system. Further, 20% of those responding indicated they do not warn
against discussing cases in law firm meetings where disclosure could
easily occur. Moreover, 31.5% do not inform lawyers joining a firm
after a screen is erected about the screen, and 44% do not send periodic
reminders regarding which screens are currently in place.
In addition, despite the requirement to give notice to the opposing
party,96 36.7% do not do so. 9 7 Even more troubling, although 83.6%
inform the present client of the existence of a screen, 42% do not inform
the client of any consequences for breach of a screen. Given the requirement that attorneys provide clients all material information necessary to
make informed choices, 98 and the duty to disclose and get client consent
where a personal conflict exists between lawyer and client, 99 this failure
is unacceptable. Because of the inherent conflict of interest between the
lawyer who wants a screen and continued employment, and the client
who wants assurances his secrets are protected, the lawyer's subjective
analysis is not enough justification.
All told, this variation among firms creates real questions regarding
the efficacy of screens. One firm responded that "a screen can be somewhat casual depending on the clients involved, the severity of the case
and the severity of the conflict."
While such an approach might work some of the time, it certainly
can create problems. Instead, each state's rules should give much more
detailed instructions by rule or ethics opinion regarding erection and
maintenance of a screen," and should require firms using screens to
attend continuing legal education seminars on the matter. Most firms
96. See MODEL RULES, Rule 1.11(a)(2); MICH. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.10(b)(2) (notice to tribunal required); OR. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5105(l)(1) (lawyer must serve affidavit attesting to screen on former law firm); PA. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10(b)(2) (written notice to appropriate client to ascertain
compliance).
97. Fifty six percent stated they shared in fees derived from the case, which violates the
MODEL RULES. See MODEL RULES, Rule 1.1l(a)(l).
98. See id. Rule 1.4; MODEL CODE, EC 7-8. For additional information regarding the

requirement of informed consent, see infra text accompanying notes 183-205.
99. See MODEL RULES, Rule 1.7(b)(2); MODEL CODE, DR 5-101(A).

100. See infra text accompanying notes 108-23.
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would appreciate the guidance. One lawyer indicated that the firm had
adopted several policies suggested by the questionnaire. As another
firm responded, "we need administrative road maps widely available so
each firm need not start from scratch to develop processes, procedures,
and the like."' 01
E. Breaching Screens
Absent such guidance, the only remaining safeguard for those
otherwise inclined to breach a screen would be the potential that one's
adversary would successfully challenge a screen. No responding firm
reported that it had ever breached a screen or that an opposing firm had
done so. There were, however, fascinating responses concerning what
firms thought about other
firms' activities and whether their own firm
02
could detect a breach.1
The first question asked was whether the firm found that other
firms have appropriate safeguards. Half declined to answer; 87% of the
other half answered in the affirmative. It is unclear whether those who
answered simply did not want to engage in "unlawyer-like" speculation,
or whether they believed that admitting awareness would not serve their
best interests. When asked whether they thought lawyers in opposing
firms inform other lawyers in their firms if a breach occurs, 50% again
declined to answer. This time they made comments indicating they had
no knowledge. Thus, it is possible the respondents were simply being
cautious. Of those responding, 65% stated they believed lawyers did
inform their colleagues.

10 3

The next question asked whether lawyers in other firms inform
their opponent if a breach occurred. Again, 50% did not respond, but
62% of those providing an answer said they believe they do not. There
were two very interesting comments provided in answer to this question.
One lawyer stated, "In most cases, I believe that breaches are not malicious and if an innocent and undamaging breach occurs here, I probably
would not inform the client either." Another wrote: "[Firms would not
inform] unless a major breach occurred. Minor breaches, if any, are
ignored."
I very much appreciated this candor, and believe that each statement shows that the lawyers have thought carefully about the issue and
101. Another stated, the "Bar Association should promulgate uniform policies and procedure

with swift approval of the state supreme court which would be followed by all attorneys."
102. One polling firm told me they ask questions in two forms: "would you do X?" and "do
you think your neighbors do X?" Often those who are unwilling to admit they do X are willing to
say that others do.
103. One respondent said "[I have] no opinion, though I do believe many firms ignore or are
cavalier about the issue."
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believe they would disclose where there is material harm. The true difficulty here is that the person making the decision about materiality is
doing so with an enormous conflict of interest. Even a person trying
very hard to do the right thing would be inclined to minimize the importance of a disclosure that otherwise could result in disqualification of the
firm should they be allowed unilaterally to decide."'
In fact, 42.6% of those responding believe opposing firms do not
tell their client if a breach occurs. Why would a lawyer not disclose to
her own client? One lawyer indicated a client would not be told because
"this is primarily a lawyer's issue." Alternatively, the concern might be
to minimize the breach of confidence by not further sharing it. However, the clients' rights are at risk, and disclosure of the occurrence of a
breach as required under Model Rules 1.4 and 1.7(b) is not the same as
disclosure of what confidences were shared. The Model Rules make it
"a client's issue."
A failure to report is extremely troublesome. It is especially dangerous because of the perceived difficulty of detecting a breach. One
hundred percent of those responding believe an opposing screen could
be breached without their firms detecting it. 105 Of the one-third willing
to answer the question, 87.5% responded that an opposing party probably has breached a screen without their knowledge.
Of course, lawyers may have responded that a screen might be
breached because, as one said, "anything is possible." I believe it is
more than caution, however, because 61.6% of those responding indicate
that they believe some breaches would be more difficult to detect than
others. For example, 58.3% believe their firm could detect that a lawyer
had disclosed the existence of a document. Those commenting indicated
they could conclude this from depositions or by a request for the document at issue. One of the less certain respondents stated the following
regarding how to learn of a leak of any information: "If the only way
the opposing party could have obtained the information was from a
screened individual, the breach can be detected. Similarly, [we could
detect] if there is a pattern of the other side having documents or information which it would not likely have without such a leak. Otherwise [it
is] very difficult to detect."
Respondents were more optimistic that they could determine facts
concerning the case were communicated; 75.8% said they could. Again,
104. One easy rationalization would be that the material was probably discoverable anyway.
See Q and A, supra note 62, at 95 (practitioners may rationalize their information is not significant
or that they do not remember it); ALl Memorandum, supra note 48, at 4-5 (no harm by disclosing
former client's aggressive assertions of privilege as she disagreed with former client's view, no
confidential facts were disclosed and court would decide privilege questions).

105. Again, 50% offered no response.
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some noted that depositions would be a source of learning that facts had
been disclosed. Others pointed out they would know facts had been disclosed if they were facts which could only be known by a "tainted lawyer." Another observed it would be easier to detect "if the facts were
not widely known and under a protective order from discovery."
Fewer lawyers thought other breaches could be detected. Thirtythree percent of those answering stated they believe they can detect disclosure of business policies and procedures; 46.2% could detect disclosure of discovery shortcuts; 38.5% believe they could discover
disclosures about discovery or trial strategy. Most difficult to discover,
in their view, would be observations concerning the character or reputation of parties or experts: only 16.6% stated they could spot such a
breach. 106

In summary, I found a large majority of responding firms take conflicts seriously and attempt to resolve them in a measured manner.
However, both they and firms with fewer concerns are hampered by
flawed conflicts detection, flawed systems for maintaining screens and,
to some extent, an adversarial rather than fiduciary analysis of screen
issues. This is aggravated by the fact that no firm responding had developed a policy of sanctions regarding breaching screens. 10 7 Moreover,
there are enormous difficulties in proving a screen has been breached.
What does this mean for the future of screens?
V.

THE DtNOUEMENT:

A.

RESOLVING THE SCREEN ISSUE

The Rule

Despite earnest attempts to use screens only where appropriate and
to construct them carefully, limited information and gaps in protective
procedures create at least some possibility of unintentional harm. Of
course, the potential for intentional breach is also present. Should
courts, therefore, prohibit the use of screens?
As indicated above, jurisdictions vary in their view of whether client choice and lawyer mobility trumps the concerns about confidences in
the private firm context.'1 8 It is my hope that the issues raised in this
article spark a renewed discussion of those policy questions.
106. In response to the questions concerning how a firm would go about proving a breach,
respondents suggested several discovery techniques: depositions; motions to show cause; and

affidavits from their lawyers showing the information could only have come from a breach. Many
pointed out that it was difficult to answer such a general question since the facts would vary so
much from case to case. One very interesting response was that proof "would be very difficult
and likely expensive. As a result, not sure the effort would be made."
107. However, one firm was "about to adopt one," and another said it had a "general policy
that breaches of firm policies will not be tolerated."
108. See supra text accompanying. notes 30-32.
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Screens are allowed for government lawyers, and some clients may
condition consent to continued representation despite a conflict upon
maintenance of a screen. Therefore, two points should be stressed even
in jurisdictions where screens are rarely used: the state bar association
should clearly define the requirements of an adequate screen, and it
should vigorously discipline those lawyers not meeting them.
Michigan Rules of Professional Responsibility Rule 1.10 provides
an example of the lack of guidance currently offered. It states:
(b) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm
may not knowingly represent a person in the same or substantially related matter in which that lawyer, or a firm with which
the lawyer was associated, is disqualified under Rule 1.9(b),
unless:
(1) the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
(2) written notice is promptly given to the appropriate tribunal to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions
of this rule."°
It and rules like it should be amended. Rule 1.10 should be changed to
read:
(b) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may not
knowingly represent a person in the same or substantially related
matter in which that lawyer is disqualified under Rule 1.9(b), unless
the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter as required by Rule 1.10(e) and is apportioned no part of the fee
therefrom.
(e) The following conditions must be present where the firm intends
to use a screen to avoid disqualification pursuant to Rule 1.10(b):
(1) The matter was not ongoing at the time the disqualified lawyer joined the firm;
(2) The firm reasonably believes that continued representation
with use of a screen will not adversely affect the interests of the
former client and is consistent with applicable law, and the present client has consented after consultation;
(3) The disqualified lawyer must not have had substantial
responsibility in the earlier matter, unless the former client has
consented to continued representation with a screen;
(4) The screen is erected immediately when the firm knows or
reasonably should know, it is necessary;
(5) All documents regarding the matter which is the subject of
the screen shall be physically segregated from other firm files and
109. MICH. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1.10.
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shall be kept in a manner which assures that no unauthorized
access to them will occur. Computer files shall also be protected
in a manner assuring no such access will occur;
(6) The personally disqualified lawyer shall submit to the firm
by which the lawyer was formerly employed, and serve on each
other party to any pertinent proceeding, a signed document attesting that during the period of disqualification the personally disqualified lawyer will not participate in any manner in the matter
or the representation, will not discuss the matter or the representation with any partner, associate, of counsel lawyer, or employee
and will not share in any fees for the matter or the representation;
(7) At least one affiliated lawyer shall submit to the same firm
and serve on the same parties, a signed document attesting that all
partners, associates, or counsel lawyers and employees are aware
of the requirement that the personally disqualified lawyer be
screened from participating in or discussing the matter or the representation, describing the procedures being taken to screen the
personally disqualified lawyer, and assuring that periodic reminders of the existence of the screen will be circulated throughout the
firm; and
8) At least one affiliated lawyer shall attest to attending continuing legal education regarding conflicts of interest and screens.
Rule 1.11 should be similarly amended. Should a jurisdiction
decide the text of the Rule is too long, it could include some of the text
in a commentary, so long as it made clear that only screens meeting the
commentary requirements are permissible.
Section (b) removes language regarding the past firm because it is
confusing and superfluous. To make a screen necessary, it will already
have been shown that the lawyer cannot rebut the presumption of receipt
of some confidences under Model Rule 1.9(b). Thus, the lawyer is disqualified without reference to her past firm. The screen rule is designed
to rebut the presumption that she passes those confidences to her new
firm. Model Rule 1.9 could be amended to reflect that if client consent
is conditioned upon a screen, the lawyer must comply with Model Rule
1.10(e).
The exclusion of screens when a case is ongoing in section (1)
reduces the likelihood of hiring lawyers to get information. In addition,
even assuming good faith, the danger of disclosure of "fresh" information is greater than that of disclosures regarding older cases.'1 ° As the
peripheral respresentation rule will allow representation where the lawyer's role was minor or disqualification was vicarious,"' this rule pro110. See supra note 47.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 19-25.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:305

hibits only lawyers actively working on a case from switching
midstream.
The requirement in section (2) that a lawyer reasonably believe that
continuing representation with a screen does not harm the former client
is consistent with law on the topic and is an attempt to avoid the problem of reasoning like an adversary rather than a fiduciary. 2 The language is drawn from Model Rule 1.7, which requires the lawyer, as
fiduciary, to make an independent, objective analysis regarding whether
it is appropriate to continue representation where there is a potential
conflict of interest, as there clearly is in these circumstances.' 3 The
reference to applicable law requires the lawyer to withdraw where case
law requires, even if she believes that client interests are not implicated.
This serves as additional protection against the likelihood the lawyer's
judgment will be impaired. This provision is especially important in
light of the absence of the requirement of former client consent.
The current client should be informed of the risks of erecting a
screen, including the possibility of hiring a new lawyer or suffering
other sanctions later. Only then can a client make an informed judgment
regarding choice of counsel." 4
The requirement in section (3) recognizes the cases that reject the
use of a screen where a lawyer's material role in earlier litigation exacerbates the likelihood of disclosure of information.'
While there is still
some room for confusion regarding how much of a role is a substantial
one, it provides lawyers with notice of a relevant factor.
The requirement in section (4) that a screen be erected immediately
is not universal," 6 but is the better rule for many reasons. It minimizes
the likelihood of inadvertent disclosure. It encourages more complete
conflicts detection procedures. It provides a clearer rule which reduces
confusion for lawyers trying to follow the rules and lessens the likelihood of adversarial rather than fiduciary reasoning. Although there may
be fewer acceptable screens, this is not an unreasonable limitation given
that the subject is an exception to well established rules concerning the
112. See supra text accompanying notes 89-94, 105.
113. Model Rule 1.7 requires that the lawyer "reasonably believe" that the representation will
not be affected. MODEL RULES, Rule 1.7(a)(1). Wolfram defines this as the judgment of a
"disinterested lawyer." WOLFRAM, supra note 9, at 341. For a discussion of Unconsentable
Conflicts, see supra note 4.
114. The Model Rules would require attorneys to inform the present client about matters as
significant as screens that may be necessary to prevent disqualification. See MODEL RULES, Rule
1.4. For additional sanctions affecting client rights, see infra text accompanying notes 124-72.
115. See, e.g., Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1980). See also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW, THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 204

affected clients of the screen).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89.

(requiring attorneys to notify all
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protection of client confidences. 7
Documents and computer files are required to be segregated in sec-

tion (5) because many courts require it and, again, the likelihood of inadvertent disclosure is reduced. Law firms should find the benefit of

additional guidance outweighs the additional burdens. Moreover, as
suggested earlier, a client may not be comfortable knowing that preser-

vation of its secrets depends on an "honor system" or an adversary's
assessment of whether the consequences of breach would be "severe."

8

Section (6), which requires the screened lawyer to send notice that
she is following the requirements for a screen, is based upon the Washington, D.C. Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 1 9 The section has
three purposes. First, it provides notice of special obligations to personally disqualified lawyers. Second, it allows opposing parties to know
immediately when a screen has been erected so they may watch for any
breach. Third, it notifies former clients who consent to screens that
objective requirements must be met.
The requirement in Section (7) that the firm attest to procedures
should provide some solace to the adversary and more likely assures the
firm actively engages in an ongoing effort to protect the integrity of the
screen.120
Section (8) requires that someone in the firm, whether managing
117. See supra text accompanying notes 1-17.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96.

119. The Washington, D.C.

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 1.1 l(d) provides:

RULE 1.11 Successive Government and Private Employment...
(d) Except as provided in paragraph (e), when any of counsel, lawyer, partner, or
associate of a lawyer personally disqualified under paragraph (a) accepts employment
in connection with a matter giving rise to the personal disqualification, the following
notifications shall be required:
(1) The personally disqualified lawyer shall submit to the public department or
agency by which the lawyer was formerly employed and serve on each other party
to any pertinent proceeding a signed document attesting that during the period of
disqualification the personally disqualified lawyer will not participate in any
manner in the matter or the representation, will not discuss the matter or the
representation with any partner, associate, or of counsel lawyer, and will not share
in any fees for the matter or the representation.
(2) At least one affiliated lawyer shall submit to the same department or agency
and serve on the same parties a signed document attesting that all affiliated
lawyers are aware of the requirement that the personally disqualified lawyer be
screened from participating in or discussing the matter or the representation and
describing the procedures being taken to screen the personally disqualified
lawyer.
Id. This rule should be altered to reflect that all constituent members of the firm, whether lawyers
or not, have responsibilities. The requirement of reminders, which reduces the likelihood of inadvertent disclosures, should also be added.
120. Section (7) is also a variation of the Washington, D.C. Rule 1.11. See supra note 119.
See also OR. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONS1imLrry DR 5-105(l) (affidavits required).
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partner, ethics partner, ethics committee members, or lawyer on the file,
1 21
maintain continuing competence regarding conflicts and screens.
States have begun mandating CLE in specific areas rather than merely
requiring CLE generally,1 2 2 and the benefit of an exception to conflicts
rules could support a concomitant requirement of competence in the
area. Some respondents suggested they would appreciate guidance in
the area. tz3 Their malpractice insurance carriers would probably appreciate it as well. States could mandate the appropriate number of credits
in a particular period.
Finally, in a "physician heal thyself" mode, I suggest each firm
adopt and circulate its written policies concerning erecting and maintaining screens, including provisions for sanctions, to all members of the
firm. Since Section (7) requires the adversary to know what the firm is
doing, all members of the affected firm should know as well.
B.

The Sanctions

Adopting rules to reduce the likelihood of inadvertent breaches of
confidential information protects client rights. To avoid negligent or
intentional breaches, it must be made clear to lawyers that it is not in
their interest to engage in a breach. 124 This can only occur if courts
severely and publicly punish lawyers who violate the rules. 125 Sanctions
121. For a discussion of the benefit of in house ethics specialists, see Jonathan M. Epstein, The
In-House Ethics Advisor: PracticalBenefits for the Modern Law Firm, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics
1011 (1994). See also Martyn, Conflict About Conflicts, supra note 63, at 60-61 (advocating
establishing firm compliance committee to audit maintenance of screens).
122. For example, the Ohio Bar requires continuing education on matters of professional ethics
and substance abuse. See Oh. Supreme Court Rules for Government of the Bar, Rule X, § 3(A).
See also PENN. R.L.C.L.E. 6105 (requiring CLE regarding professionalism, substance abuse and
ethics).
123. Specific references to what information should be included in a conflicts check was not
included in the questioning because the rule was getting long enough. However, the types of
information asked for in the questionnaires could be included for guidance either in a comment to
the Rule or in CLE sessions. Firms should certainly keep track of parties and affiliated entities, as
well as information about all lawyers and staff working on matters. Firms should also ask new
hires, whether lawyers or staff members, about past and present matters they have worked on. For
a further discussion of the attributes of a screen, see supra text accompanying notes 37-38. For
additional suggestions, see The Task Force on Conflicts of Interest, Conflicts of Interest Issues, 50
Bus. LAW. 1381 (1995), which discusses several screen forms. See also Martyn, Visions of the
Eternal Law Firm, supra note 44, at 948-54.
124. This would include intentional or negligent continuation of representation with a screen
under circumstances where the lawyer is not entitled to do so.
125. As Professor Richard Epstein has observed regarding conflicts rules generally:
In dealing with the necessary legal response, it is possible to adopt one of two
general models. The first of these models takes the position that it is never quite
clear what a conflict of interest is, so that the proper judicial response is to evaluate
the facts and circumstances of each case in deciding what should be done. Given
the absence of clarity in the rules, the impulse would be to impose relatively minor
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may include those imposed by courts as part of their regulatory function,
remedies for former clients, and remedies for present clients.
1.

COURT SANCTIONS

Disqualification is the most widely reported sanction.126 It has not
served as a total deterrent to intentional breaches, 127 perhaps because of
the lack of clarity in screen cases 28 or because the lawyer assumes that
it is worth taking risks because she will more often come out ahead if
More serious and predictable sanctions would
she disobeys the rules.
129
analysis.
the
change
Discipline could be imposed for violating screens; 13° it should regsanctions on the lawyers who deviate from the accepted conflict of interest standard,
such as it is. Firms with conflicts of interest will be allowed to collect their fees for
services rendered, and perhaps the work product of discovery and document
analysis will be preserved for the benefit of the successor firm.
I believe, however, that the alternative model is the correct one. That model
works from the assumption that it is desirable, first, to have bright-line rules, and,
second, to impose very heavy sanctions on those law firms that deviate from these
rules. The point of the strategy is not heartless cruelty. It is an effort to structure
incentives so as to minimize the number of violations that take place in order to
avoid the difficulties of running a clean-up operation, at enormous inconvenience
and expense to everyone, after the conflicts have occurred.
Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Lawyers' Conflicts of Interest, 60 FORDHAM L. REv.
579, 591 (1992).
126. See, e.g., Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977);
Hutnick v. Inland Steel Co., No. 86 C 2567, 1987 WL 9003, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 1987);
Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Hallmark Dodge, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 516 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Williams v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. Mo. 1984); In re Columbia Realty Assocs.,
71 B.R. 804 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987); Smart Indus. Corp., Mfg. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 1176
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
127. See, e.g., Fund of Funds, 567 F.2d at 232 (firm's involvement in suit filed by one client
against another included sorting documents, preparing legal opinions, and coordinating interviews
and discussions); Hutnick, 1987 WL 9003, at *2 (lawyer's response to insurer's motion to
disqualify based on substantial work for insurer prior to joining plaintiffs firm was to serve
deposition and document requests); Hallmark Cards, 616 F. Supp. at 521 (new lawyer
immediately began active participation and free discussion in case against client of his old firm);
Williams, 588 F. Supp. 1037 (former legal assistant for TWA was fired and subsequently called
plaintiffs lawyer in pending discrimination suit against TWA to represent her in suit against TWA
as well. Plaintiff's lawyer informs TWA that he now has "in-house expert."); In re Columbia
Realty, 71 B.R. at 807-08, 810 (lawyer whose name was on pleading, was head of bankruptcy
department; court concludes he must have had input).
128. See supra notes 88-91.
129. See supra note 125.
130. Courts have disciplined attorneys for disclosing client secrets. See, e.g., Kentucky Bar
Ass'n v. Meredith, 752 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1988) (public reprimand for disclosing confidences
without client's consent); In re Pool, 517 N.E.2d 444 (Mass. 1988) (court recognized propriety of
earlier disbarrment of attorney for breach of confidences but reinstated him as event occurred
many years previous to disbarrment and attorney was young); In re Nelson, 327 N.W.2d 576
(Minn. 1982) (reprimand and suspension for wrongfully disclosing client confidences); In re
Wyse, 688 P.2d 758 (Mont. 1984), modified, 697 P.2d 94 (Mont. 1985) (attorney held in contempt
and publicly reprimanded); Bar Ass'n v. Watkins, 427 N.E.2d 516 (Ohio 1981) (attorney
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ularly happen. Upon disqualifying a firm, judges should report violations of the rules as a matter of course and let the state bar review the

behavior. 13' It has been suggested that disciplining a firm may also be
appropriate where the firm has poor mechanisms for assuring ethical
practice. 32 In firms having no policy or a lax policy regarding screens,
such discipline might be warranted.

Moreover, a lawyer who wrongfully represents a client when she is
required to decline or discontinue representation arguably multiplies the
proceedings by opposing motions to disqualify and by requiring the
33
court to order additional proceedings with new, untainted counsel.' 1 If

the lawyer's refusal to disqualify herself is intentional or reckless, a federal judge could assess costs and attorney fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927.134
A broader range of sanctions is available pursuant to the court's

inherent power to supervise proceedings generally, as well as supervissuspended indefinitely). See also In re Searer, 950 F. Supp. 811 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (reprimand
for contacting adversary without consent of adversary's counsel).
131. See Crystal, supra note 3, at 311 (intentional cases of misconduct should be referred to
disciplinary agencies). Any person can report a lawyer to the bar. See ABA STANDARD FOR
DISCIPLINE, at 22. Judges have a duty to report violations of the rules reflecting on fitness to
practice law. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3:B(3). See MODEL RULES, Rule 8.4;
MODEL CODE, DR 1-103. Some judges do report ethical violations. See, e.g., In re Direct
Satellite Communications, Inc., 96 B.R. 507, 522 n.4. (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989). See also Stephen
R. Ripps & John N. Drowatzky, FederalRule 11: Are the FederalDistrict Courts Usurping the
Disciplinary Function of the Bar? 32 VAL. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997) (judges provided
varying responses regarding whether they reported Rule 11 violations to the bar).
132. See generally Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1 (1991).
133. To avoid such a disruption, one court disqualified a lawyer and ordered his firm to
continue representing the client without pay. See Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 536 A.2d
243 (N.J. 1988).
134. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994) provides:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the
United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the
excess costs, expenses and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such
conduct.
Id. See, e.g., United States v. Associated Convalescent Enters., 766 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1985)
(monetary sanctions against defense attorney for appearing as counsel when he knew that the
government had listed him as a witness; disqualification occurred just before trial multiplied proceedings); Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank, 751 F.2d 1193 (11 th Cir. 1985) (defense attorney disqualified and fined $50,000 for cooperating in plan to improperly contact plaintiff class members). For
a collection of § 1927 cases, see SANCTIONS: RULE 11 & OTHER POWERS ( Melissa L. Nelken ed.,
3d ed. 1992). For a discussion of the standard of conduct required, see Janet Eve Josselyn, Note,
The Song of the Sirens-Sanctioning Lawyers Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 31 B.C. L. REV. 477
(1990); Debra T. Landis, Annotation, What Conduct Constitutes Multiplying ProceedingsUnreasonably and Vexatiously So as to Warrant Imposition of Liability on Counsel Under 28 USCS
§ 1927 for Excess Costs, Expenses, and Attorney Fees, 81 A.L.R. FED. 36 (1987).
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ing attorneys practicing before it. 135 Courts have fined lawyers for bad
faith behavior 136 and have disciplined them as well. 137

In addition, courts have the inherent power to enter orders affecting
itself, which also has an effect on the present client. A whole
lawsuit
the
range of sanctions, from excluding evidence138 to dismissing the suit, 13 9
may be available.
When a lawyer wrongfully accepts or continues representation of a
present client despite the fact she or her firm represented a former client

in a substantially related matter, the concern is that she potentially had
access to information she can now use against the former client.140 Two
groups of cases seem related to this problem: wrongful access to evidence cases141 and cases involving lawyer communications with repre142
sented persons.

In both scenarios, courts have recognized the breadth of their inher-

ent power and have employed a broad range of sanctions. In Kramer v.
Boeing Co., 143 a lawyer named Fitzgerald retained documents from an
earlier suit despite a protective order requiring their return after the ear-

lier suit was settled.1" Defendant filed a motion in the first court to find
the lawyer in contempt; Fitzgerald responded by asking for a modifica-

tion of the protective order. The court rejected Fitzgerald's argument
that "he would be forced to repeat the time consuming and expensive
135. See Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50-51 (1991) (affirming sanction of over
$996,000 on the grounds that courts have inherent power to sanction bad faith conduct). In
Chambers, the Court also stated, "a federal court has the power to control admission to its bar and
to discipline attorneys who appear before it." Id. at 43; In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 (1985)
(recognizing power to regulate attorney conduct, but reversing suspension for refusal to provide
documentation in support of fee request because the standard for imposing discipline was not
met).
136. See, e.g., Kleiner, 751 F.2d at 1193 (defense attorney fined $50,000 for participating in
scheme to contact plaintiff class members); Miranda v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 710 F.2d 516
(9th Cir. 1983) (court has power to fine counsel for violation of local rules but should hold hearing
before sanctions imposed).
137. See, e.g., NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc., 894 F.2d 696 (5th Cir.
1990), aff'd sub nom. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (one lawyer disbarred and
two suspended). See also Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985)
(noting that courts have "disbarred, suspended from practice, or reprimanded attorneys for abuse
of the judicial process").
138. See Esser v. A.H. Robins Co., 537 F. Supp. 197, 203 (D. Minn. 1982) (allowing voluntary
withdrawal but requiring all inappropriate materials to be viewed by special master and removed
from files prior to transfer to new counsel). See also infra text accompanying notes 164-75.
139. See, e.g., Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1557 n.6 (11th Cir. 1987) ("court has the
power either to dismiss a case with prejudice or to enter a default judgment .. . in extreme
situations"). See also infra text accompanying notes 156, 175.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 5-17.
141. See infra text accompanying notes 143-59.
142. See infra text accompanying notes 157-76.
143. 134 F.R.D. 256 (D. Minn. 1991).
144. Id.
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discovery process in the [second] action" if he were required to return
the documents. 145 Concluding that Fitzgerald's responsibility to return
documents overrode efficiency considerations, the court found him in
contempt and ordered him to pay costs and fees for multiplying the proceedings.1 46 Kramer supports the proposition that a lawyer aware of
only discoverable information is not protected from having sanctions
imposed.
The lawyer may not be the only one who is penalized. In Red Star
Towing & Transportation Co. v. Ming Giant, 47 counsel for plaintiff
intentionally and surreptitiously submitted exhibits that had not been
entered into evidence to the jury. 48 The court concluded that the evidence supported an excessive award and granted remittitur. It further
ordered that if plaintiff did not accept the remittitur, the court would
consider whether a new trial should be ordered or whether the court
should view the misconduct as a waiver of the right to a jury trial and
enter its own findings of fact.' 49 Thus, the attorney not only risked a
personal sanction, he also substantially prejudiced his client's rights. 5 °
Similarly, the court in Esser v. A. H. Robins Co. 5 ' required all evidence
in the withdrawing counsel's file to be reviewed by a special master and
removed if tainted by the plaintiff's lawyer's business relationship with
52
an adjuster for the defendant's insurance company.'
In In re Potash Antitrust Litigation,13 in-house counsel resigned
from his company and provided information to potential plaintiffs in an
antitrust action against his former client. 54 The court disqualified the
145. Id. at 259.

146. See id. The court was relying on authority granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1927. See id. The
Ninth Circuit has held that one seeking sanctions for violation of a protective order must return to

the original court. See Kirshner v. Uniden Corp., 842 F.2d 1074, 1080 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing 4
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
26.78, at 26-503 to 26-504 (2d ed.
1987)). However, a court's inherent power is broader than that of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and the inherent power may be used to sanction behavior beyond the discovery

context. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46-50 (1991). See also infra text
accompanying notes 153-61.
147. 552 F. Supp. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
148. See id. at 378.
149. See id. The court also noted that there was a substantial basis for awarding the defendant

some or all of the costs and attorneys' fees incurred if there was a retrial. See id. at 388 (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1927 and referring to court's inherent power).
150. As a result, the client had a legal malpractice cause of action for damages caused by the
lawyer's misconduct. See infra text accompanying notes 173-76.

151. 537 F. Supp. 197 (D. Minn. 1982).
152. See id. at 203. Sanctions have also been imposed where clients wrongfully obtained
evidence. See, e.g., Lipin v. Bender, 597 N.Y.S.2d 340 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (dismissal was an

appropriate sanction for plaintiffs surreptitious removal and use of defendant's confidential
documents).
153. Civ. No. 3-93-197, No. MDL 981, 1993 WL 543013, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 8, 1993).
154. See id. at *5-7.
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attorney and held that no evidence provided by him could be used to

support the plaintiffs' claims. 5 5 The court further ordered the plaintiffs
to file an amended complaint based on information obtained indepen-

dently of the tainted evidence. Failure to do so would result in dismissal
of the plaintiffs' suit.1 56 Hence, the ultimate sanction of dismissal is a
possibility where counsel wrongfully uses confidences gained in a relationship with a former client to aid another client.
Cases involving wrongful access to people rather than to information make the same point. Both the Model Code 5 7 and the Model
Rules1 58 prohibit lawyers from communicating with persons represented

by counsel. Although some lawyers have been disqualified for the practice and have been ordered to pay costs and fees,

59

some courts have

imposed additional sanctions that implicate client interests.
For example, counsel has been required to disclose all contacts
made. 1 60 Moreover, courts have ordered that evidence gained through
such means may not be admitted.' 6' In Papanicolaouv. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 16 2 the plaintiff arrived at defense counsel's office to

attend a deposition which had already concluded. The plaintiff asked
155. See id. at *18-19.
156. See id. The district court ultimately granted defendants' motions for summary judgment
on the Third Amended Complaint. See In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 954 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Minn.
1997).
157. See MODEL CODE, DR 7-104.
158. See MODEL RULES, Rule 4.2.
159. See, e.g., Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank, 751 F.2d 1193 (1 lth Cir. 1985); Faison v. Thornton,
863 F. Supp. 1204 (D. Nev. 1993) (attorneys were disqualified and ordered to pay costs for
improperly contacting opposing party); Rentclub, Inc. v. Transamerica Rental Fin. Corp., 811 F.
Supp. 651 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (disqualification for improper contact); MMR/Wallace Power &
Indus., Inc. v. Thames Assocs., 764 F. Supp. 712 (D. Conn. 1991) (disqualification for contacting
former member of opposing party's litigation team); Papanicolaou v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A., 720 F Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (disqualification).
Courts may also deny disqualification motions where they conclude that other sanctions can
avoid harm. See, e.g., Meat Price Investigators Assoc. v. Spencer Foods, Inc., 572 F.2d 163, 165
(8th Cir. 1978) (no prejudice); Kitchen v. Aristech Chem., 769 F. Supp. 254, 258-59 (S.D. Ohio
1991) (exclusion of evidence would suffice); In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig., No. 80 C 3479,
1986 WL 1846, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 1986) (awarding costs of motion for sanctions). See
generally Crystal, supra note 3, at 273 (disqualification motions should not be granted absent taint
to trial, damages and discipline are better alternatives); Green, supra note 3, at 71
(disqualifications should not be based on conflict of interest rules). See also infra notes 181, 186.
160. See, e.g., McCallum v. CSX Transp., Inc., 149 F.R.D. 104, 113 (M.D.N.C. 1993); In re
Industrial Gas, 1986 WL 1846, at *4.
161. See McCallum, 149 F.R.D. at 113 (employer admissions from ex parte interviews
inadmissible); Contini v. Hyundai Motor Co., No. 90 CIV. 3547 (VLB), 1991 WL 274465, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1991); Cagguila v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 127 F.R.D. 653 (E. D. Pa. 1989)
(admissions inadmissible but employees may be deposed). Cf Kitchen, 769 F. Supp. at 258-59
(court denies disqualification motion because defendants had not shown why the remedy of
preventing evidence from being admitted would not suffice to prevent prejudice).
162. 720 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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defense counsel how the case was going, and the two spoke for an hour
and a half.'63 In disqualifying the firm, the court rejected the defend-

ant's argument that "given the exhaustive discovery in the underlying
litigation, none of the disclosed information was new to him ...

[and

that] plaintiff would soon have to reveal his theories anyway in answering the defendant's forthcoming motion for summary judgment."'" The
court disqualified the firm from continuing its representation of the
defendants from the date of the meeting with the plaintiff. 65 In addition,
it required that depositions after the meeting date be deleted from the
record, and that the firm relinquish only that work product generated
before the meeting to the new counsel.' 6 6 All measures, in the court's

1 67
view, were necessary "to protect the integrity of [the] dispute."
Similarly, recognizing that the flagrancy of the violation may be
taken into account in fashioning a remedy, the court in Faison v. Thornton 16 8 exercised its broad discretion under its inherent powers and
excluded all evidence gathered in an ex parte manner. 69 Although the
court in Faison declined to dismiss the case, the court cited Link v.
Wabash RailroadCo.' 70 as support for the power to dismiss the case as a
result of lawyer misconduct if other remedies were inadequate. 7 '
Courts have a wide range of inherent power. In related cases of
wrongful access to evidence, courts have been willing to use it both
directly against the lawyer and in ways that impact the client. In fact,
the possibility exists that, when there is no lesser alternative, dismissal
may even be appropriate. Such remedies can and should be employed in
the case of a breach of a screen. Information gained in such a manner
should not be admissible, and the disqualified lawyer should not be able
to transmit it to new counsel. In a rare case of collusion by the client or
where a case cannot be supported without using wrongfully obtained

163. See id. at 1081-82.
164. Id. at 1085. In rejecting defendant's argument, the court cited Zeller v. Bogue Electric
Manufacturing Corp., 346 F. Supp. 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), which rejected a similar contention.
165. See Papanicolaou, 720 F. Supp. at 1087-88. The court refused to allow the firm to

continue despite the firm's attempt to screen the disqualified lawyer because the screen was
untimely. See id.
166. See id. at 1088.
167. Id. at 1087.
168. 863 F. Supp. 1204 (D. Nev. 1993).
169. See id. at 1214-15, 1218. Courts have recognized that negligent violations of rules against
communication are also sanctionable. See id. at 1214; In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig., No. 80
C 3479, 1986 WL 1846, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 1986) (negligent instructions to investigator).
The attorneys in Faison were also required to pay attorneys' fees of approximately $46,000. See
Faison, 863 F. Supp. at 1218, 1221.

170. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
171. See Faison, 863 F. Supp. at 1215.
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evidence, the case should be dismissed. 7 2
2.

FORMER CLIENT SANCTIONS

In addition to sanctions imposed as part of its regulatory function, a
court may also find that harm to the former client should be directly
remedied. There are several ways for this to occur.
First, the former client may sue the lawyer for malpractice. In
Damron v. Herzog,17 3 for example, the Ninth Circuit found that representation of a client in a matter substantially related to the subject matter
of a previous representation could support a malpractice claim by a former client.17 4 In so doing, the court rejected an argument that the lawyer
could not be responsible to a client in malpractice after an attorneyclient relationship had ended, finding "in the common law a continuing
duty owed by attorneys to former clients not to represent an interest
adverse to a former client on a matter substantially related to the matter
of engagement."' 75 Many jurisdictions have held generally that violations of conflict rules in ethical codes are at least some evidence of
76
malpractice. 1
In addition, a former client may maintain an action for breach of
fiduciary duty. The attorney-client relationship has been referred to as a
172. A lawyer risks being sanctioned for breaching the screen. This risk should be disclosed to
the new client. See infra text accompanying notes 201-205.
173. 67 F.3d 211 (9th Cir. 1995).
174. See id.
175. Id. at 213. "With increasing frequency, attorneys are being sued for legal malpractice
arising from adverse representation against former clients or from untimely disqualification."
RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 16.23, at 483 (4th ed. 1996)
[hereinafter MALLEN]. For a lengthy list of such malpractice cases, see id. § 16.23, at 483-88.
176. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Herzog, 672 So. 2d 701 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (lawyer represented
both sides in merger); Jenkins v. Wheeler, 316 S.E.2d 354 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (attorney for
beneficiaries may not also represent interest of administratrix). The Jenkins court observed that
"[an attorney's representation of two or more clients with adverse or conflicting interests
constitutes such misconduct as to subject him to liability for malpractice." Id. at 358 (quoting 7
AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 198, at 248 (1980)). For a general discussion of malpractice
actions based on conflicting interests, see MALLEN, supra note 175, § 15.18, at 393-98. There is a
split of opinion regarding usage of ethics rules as a standard in malpractice cases:
Courts take four different approaches ... First, some courts hold that professional
ethical standards conclusively establish the duty of care and that any violation
constitutes negligence per se. Second, a minority of courts finds that a professional
ethical violation establishes a rebuttable presumption of legal malpractice. Third, a
large majority of courts treats professional ethical standards as evidence of the
common law duty of care. Finally, one court has found professional ethical
standards inadmissible as evidence of an attorney's duty of care.
Marc R. Greenough, The Inadmissibilityof ProfessionalEthical Standards in Legal Malpractice
Actions After Hizey v. Carpenter, 68 WASH. L. REv. 395, 398-399 (1993). See generally Note,
The Evidentiary Use of the Ethics Codes in Legal Malpractice: Erasing a Double Standard, 109
HARV. L. REv. 1102 (1996).
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"paradigm[atic]" fiduciary relationship.1 77 As the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania observed in Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton &
Sheetz, 7 8 "at common law, an attorney owes a fiduciary duty to his client; such duty demands undivided loyalty and prohibits the attorney
from engaging in conflicts of interest, and breach of such duty is

actionable." 7 9
Several remedies are available. In Maritrans, the court enjoined
the firm from representing competitors of the former client because the

length and intensity of its involvement with the former client created too
great a likelihood that confidences would be revealed. 8° In addition, if
the former client establishes a causal relationship between a breach of
fiduciary duty and losses, he may be entitled to damages.

81

A breach of a fiduciary duty theory provides opportunities for damages that a malpractice case does not. First, regardless of whether damages could be shown, a wronged principal is entitled to a disgorgement
of fees or a denial of a petition for fees if unpaid. 82 As the Supreme
Court has stated, "A fiduciary ...may not perfect his claim to compensation by insisting that, although he had conflicting interests, he served
his several masters equally well or that his primary loyalty was not
weakened by the pull of his secondary one." '83

Thus, as soon as conflict has been shown, a past client should be
177. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of FiduciaryObligation, 1988 DuKE
L. J. 879, 908. See also Pizzimenti, Duty to Warn, supra note 4, at 463-64 (breach of fiduciary
duty is most appropriate cause of action for improperly shared confidences).
178. 602 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 1992).

179. Id. at 1283.
180. See id. at 1286-87.
181. See id. at 1286. See also Stanley v. Richmond, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)
(lawyer representing wife in divorce concurrently negotiating to join law firm of husband's
lawyer; judgment of nonsuit reversed as wife raised issue of fact regarding whether breach of
fiduciary duty was proximate cause of damage); MALLEN, supra note 175, § 14.5, at 245. I have
suggested elsewhere that a breach of confidence may support actions in contract, malpractice, and
breach of fiduciary duty. See Pizzimenti, Duty to Warn, supra note 4, at 463-64.
182. For an excellent discussion of the use of disgorgement as a remedy for representation of
conflicting interests, see Susan R. Martyn, Developing the Judicial Role in Controlling Litigation
Conflicts: Response to Green, 65 FORDHAm L. Rv.131, 144-46 (1996); Crystal, supra note 3, at
311-12. See also MALLEN, supra note 175, § 15.19, at 398-400, § 16.22, at 482-83.
183. Woods v. City Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 269 (1941). Many fee denials or
disgorgements occur in the bankruptcy context. See, e.g., In re Diamond Mortgage Corp., 135
B.R. 78 (Bankr. N.D. I11.
1990); In re Direct Satellite Communications, Inc., 96 B.R. 507 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1989). However, fee disgorgement is a well-established principle in fiduciary law
generally. See, e.g., Blecher & Collins, P.C. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1442 (C.D.
Cal. 1994); Financial Gen. Bankshares, Inc. v. Metzger, 523 F. Supp. 744 (D.D.C. 1981); In re
Estate of Shano, 869 P.2d 1203 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); Goldstein v. Lees, 120 Cal. Rptr. 253 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1975); White v. Roundtree Transp., Inc., 386 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Perl v. St.
Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d 209 (Minn. 1984); Zeiden v. Oliphant, 54 N.Y.S.2d 27
(N.Y. App. Div. 1945); In re Estate of Ragan, 775 P.2d 1383 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
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entitled to recoup fees earlier paid. Both the Restatement (Second) of
85
Agency"8 4 and the Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers
support this view." 6 The penalty of surrendering fees long since earned
may provide lawyers and firms incentive to take more care in avoiding
18 7
conflicts of interest.
Additional motivation may be found in the doctrine that fiduciaries
must account for any profit gained by using information obtained from a
confidential relationship.18 8 For example, in David Welch Co. v. Erskine
& Tully, 18 a law firm performed legal work for a collection agency
184. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY: AGENT VS. PRINCIPAL § 469 (1957) provides:
Disloyalty or Insubordination as Defense - An agent is entitled to no compensation
for conduct which is disobedient or which is a breach of his duty of loyalty; if such
conduct constitutes a wilful and deliberate breach of his contract of service, he is not
entitled to compensation even for properly performed services for which no
compensation is apportioned.
Id.
185. The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49 (Preliminary Draft
No. 11, 1995):
A lawyer engaging in clear and serious violation of duty to a client may be required
to forfeit some or all of the lawyer's compensation for the matter. In determining
whether and to what extent forfeiture is appropriate, relevant considerations include
the gravity and time of the violation, its wilfulness, its impact on the value of the
lawyer's work for the client, any other threatened or actual harm to the client, and
the adequacy of other remedies.
Id.
186. See also Martyn, Developing the JudicialRole, supra note 182, at 143-45 (discussing the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS).

187. See Crystal, supra note 3, at 311-12 (noting a case finding disgorgement served as a
sanction for misconduct and deterrrence of future misconduct); Green, supra note 3, at 73
(personal sanctions should be used). Further, Professor Farnsworth observed, "[T]he law of
fiduciary relations ... is distinctly concerned with deterrence and ethical standards." E. Allan
Farnsworth, Your Loss Or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principlein Breach of
Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1358 (1985). Professor Crystal recognized the ability of courts to
fashion an appropriate remedy to the facts of a case:
Courts can be extremely flexible in their use of damage awards for unethical
conduct, varying the award depending on the degree of misconduct and the harm
that results. For example, if a law firm has withdrawn from representation of a
client because it inadvertently engaged in a conflict of interest, the court might
award the former client legal fees sufficient to compensate it for the expense of
familiarizing counsel with the matter. On the other hand, if the firm knowingly
engaged in such a conflict, the court might award these expenses and also require
the firm to disgorge any legal fees already paid as punishment ....
Crystal, supra note 3, at 312.
188. See Martyn, Developing the Judicial Role, supra note 182, at 145 ("Fee forfeiture...
serves the purpose of deterring attorney misconduct, 'a goal worth furthering regardless of
whether a particular client has been harmed."'); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY: PRINCIPAL
VS. AGENT § 388 (1957) (agent has duty to give profit to principal). See generally Farnsworth,
supra note 187, at 1354-60; DeMott, supra note 177, at 900-01. A partial disgorgement may be
appropriate if some work was done before a conflict arose. See Martyn, Developing the Judicial
Role, supra note 182, at 144.
189. 250 Cal. Rptr. 339 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
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specializing in collecting delinquent employer contributions owed to
employee trust funds. 190 After the agency stopped using the firm, the
firm began to compete for the collection work and took over some of the
collection agency's accounts without the agency's consent. The court
accepted evidence that the agency had provided information regarding
how to do such work and that the agency operated in a manner designed
to assure confidentiality. 9 ' The court concluded that the competition
was a breach of the firm's fiduciary duty 9 2 and further found that
requiring the firm to disgorge all profits made from the later work was

appropriate.

93

Because profits are recoverable for breach of fiduciary

duty even where no harm to the principal is shown, 94 lawyers could
arguably be asked to disgorge to the prior client monies earned in the
later representation.

Finally, in cases of a willful breach of fiduciary duty, punitive damages have been awarded.' 9 In Cummings v Sea Lion Corp.,'96 for
example, the Alaska Supreme Court found that a failure to "fully and

fairly disclose" a personal conflict of interest could support a finding of
190. See id.
191. See id. at 341.
192. See id. at 343.
193. See id. at 345. The David Welch court used the device of a constructive trust. See id. For
a discussion of the constructive trust doctrine, see Tamar Frankel, FiduciaryLaw, 71 CAL. L. REV.
795, 827-29 (1983).
194. In Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980), an agent was required to account for
profits gained from violating a confidentiality agreement despite no finding of actual damages,
because the remedy was viewed as a "natural and customary consequence of a breach of trust. It
deals fairly with both parties by confirming relief to the dimensions of the wrong." Id. at 515. As
Professor DeMott explains:
The general goal of contract damages, in short, is to compensate the plaintiff
for loss of an expected advantage. The law of fiduciary obligation calculates
damages from a very different perspective. That perspective dictates that the
plaintiff is entitled to recover specific restitution of any benefit that the defendant
obtained through his breach or, if specific restitution is not feasible, money damages
that quantify the defendant's benefit. Even if the fiduciary's actions have not
injured the beneficiary, and even if the beneficary has in some sense gained as a
result of the fiduciary's act, the fiduciary must account to the beneficiary for its
profits.
DeMott, supra note 177, at 888 (footnote numbers omitted). See also Farnsworth, supra note 187,
at 1358-59 n.74 (observing that fiduciary law should not be used in normal arm's length contract
disputes because it "unrelentingly applies the disgorgement principle . . . with little regard to
questions of cause in fact, joint cause or remote cause" and does not ask if some portion of the
profits were attributable to the "skill, industry, or capital" of the agent).
195. See, e.g., Jerman v. O'Leary, 701 P.2d 1205, 1210-11 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (punitive
damages can be awarded for breach of fiduciary duty in proper case; remanded as jury issue
existed); International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567, 584 (Tex. 1963)
(exemplary damages for willful breach of fiduciary duty). See also Farnsworth, supra note 187, at
1358; Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic
Characterand Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1069-74 (1991).
196. 924 P.2d 1011 (Alaska 1996).
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"fiduciary fraud" and an imposition of punitive damages. 197 Such damages would be appropriate in a case like In re Potash Antitrust Litigation,198 where the attorney contacted several adversaries and provided
them with information after he had been fired. 99
3.

PRESENT CLIENT SANCTIONS

As previously discussed, the lawyer owes a fiduciary duty to refrain
from representing conflicting interests. 2" As a result, the current client
may seek the same remedies that the prior client may seek. There are a
few specific issues relevant to the current client, however.
First, a fiduciary may represent conflicting interests if she notifies
the clients and obtains their informed consent. 20 1 Thus, the attorney
may have a defense both to a malpractice case and to a claim for fee
disgorgement if the client is aware of the past representation and nevertheless consents to the representation.
However, a caveat leads to a second point. Even assuming the
present client is aware of the past representation, it is unlikely that the
lawyer has elicited a truly informed consent. As previously discussed,
many lawyers may not even tell a client if a breach of a screen occurs.2 02
Moreover, telling a client about a past relationship does not provide an
opportunity to give informed consent absent a full recitation of the consequences to the client, such as the potential to suffer loss and delay
because his lawyer is disqualified 213 or the client's suit is limited or dismissed. 2 ' Absent such consent, the present client is entitled to the same
remedies as the former client.
In addition, a present client may have an additional malpractice or
breach of fiduciary duty claim against the lawyer for her breach of duty
to provide informed consent. Courts have been especially willing to find
such a duty when the information withheld involves a conflict of interest.20 5 Withholding information that might cause a client to take a case
197. Id. at 1022. The court concluded there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's
finding that the lawyer's refusal to disclose the conflict amounted to "outrageous ... [r]eckless
indifference to the rights of others." Id. (citing Barber v. National Bank, 815 P.2d 857, 864
(Alaska 1991)).

198. Civ. No. 3-93-197, No. MDL 981, 1993 WL 543013, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 8, 1993).
199. See id.

200. See supra notes 177-78.
201. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF AGENCY:

PRINCIPAL vs. AGENT §

394 (1957);

MODEL

RULES, Rules 1.7, 1.9; MODEL CODE, DR 5-101, -105; David Welch Co. v. Erskine & Tully, 250
Cal. Rptr. 339 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
202. See supra text following note 103.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 127-28.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 138-172.
205. See Pizzimenti, Duty to Warn, supra note 3, at 471-76.
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elsewhere meets that test.
All the firms responding to the questionnaire indicated that existence of such sanctions would make it less likely that lawyers would
breach a screen. As sanctions currently exist, lawyers need to be made
aware of them. Awareness would be furthered if lawyers were required
to have continuing legal education regarding screens.
VI.

EPILOGUE

The truth about screens is that lawyers attempting to do the right
thing need guidance, and lawyers attempting to cheat need to know that

the consequences are not worth the risk. Clearer screen rules and predictable sanctions could go a long way to resolve these problems.
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1997]
QUESTIONNAIRE

Instructions
Following is a questionnaire regarding screens. I have attempted to ask
questions requiring a "yes" or "no" answer whenever possible to reduce
the time it will take you to respond. Please circle "yes," "no," or "not
applicable" where appropriate. It would be most helpful if you would
elaborate where relevant. Space is provided to respond, but feel free to
attach additional comments or materials where appropriate. Thank you
again for participating in this survey.
A. General Information
1. Please circle the answer which best describes your
firm.
a. 50-100 lawyers
b. 100-200 lawyers

2.

c. 200+ lawyers
Please circle the answer which best describes your
firm.

a. One office
b. More than one office; all located in same state
c. More than one office; one or more offices located

outside state of main office.
3. Please circle the answer which best describes your
office.
a. Fewer than 50 lawyers
b. 50-100 lawyers
c. 100-200 lawyers
d. 200+ lawyers
B. Ethics and Professional Responsibility Resources
4. Do you present any in-house CLE programs relating
to professional responsibility, ethics or professionalism?
IF SO, briefly identify programs presented within the
previous two years.
5. Do your lawyers attend outside CLE programs
dealing with these subjects? Please briefly explain.
6. Are any lawyers in your firm involved in any
activities of the organized bar dealing with ethics,
discipline or professionalism?
IF SO, please briefly describe such involvement.

YES NO

YES NO
YES NO
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7.

What treatises, services or other library resources do
you have available on the premises relating to the
subject of professional responsibility and ethics?
C. Identifying Conflicts
8. Upon receiving a new matter in the office:
a. Does your firm circulate a memo describing the
matter?

YES NO

IF SO, who circulates memo:
IF
1.
2.
3.

SO, does the memo include:
description of matter?
name of individual/partnership/corporation?
names of related corporate or partnership
entities?
4. names of partners/corporate officers?
5. names of directors?
6. names of controlling shareholders?
7. names of co-plaintiffs?
8. names of co-defendants?
9. names of opposing counsel?
b. Does your firm maintain and consult an index of
client matters handled by the firm?
IF
1.
2.
3.
4.

SO:
Is index computerized?
Does index include present clients?
Does index include past clients?
Does index include name of individual/partnership/ corporation?
5. Does index include related corporate or partnership entities?
6. Does index include partners/corporate
officers?
7. Does index include names of directors?
8. Does index include names of controlling
shareholders?
9. Does index include co-plaintiffs?
10. Does index include co-defendants?
11. Does index include opposing counsel?
12. Does index include brief description of
subject matter of representation?
13. Does index include list of lawyers and
paralegals who worked on the matter?
14. Is index updated to reflect changes in the
above information?
15. Are any such changes communicated to
lawyers working on relevant files?

YES NO N/A
YES NO N/A
YES NO N/A
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
NO

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES NO N/A
YES NO N/A
YES NO N/A
YES NO N/A
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES NO N/A
YES NO N/A
YES NO N/A
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16.

Does index include additional information
not mentioned above?

YES NO N/A

IF SO, what other information is included?
c. Does your firm have an alternative or additional
procedure regarding receipt of new matters that is
not outlined above?

YES NO N/A

IF SO, please briefly describe it.
d. How are firm members made aware of your
policy regarding new matters?

9.

e. To whom in the law firm is information indicating
a conflict of interest given?
f. What happens if the new matter procedure uncovers a potential conflict of interest?
g. What procedure, if any, does your firm follow
when an existing client presents the firm with a
new matter?
h. What procedure, if any, does your firm follow
regarding identification of conflicts when merging
with another firm?
Which of the following mechanisms, if any, does
your law firm have for identifying or resolving ethical
or professional issues?
a. Is there a partner or principal in the firm or office
responsible for considering or resolving such
issues?

YES NO

IF SO, please briefly describe the scope of his/her
authority regarding such issues.
b. Is there a committee within the firm to identify,
discuss and resolve such issues?
IF SO, please describe its composition and jurisdiction, and at what intervals it meets.
c. Under what circumstances, if any, are decisions of
the relevant partner or committee reviewed by the
person or group charged with management of the
firm?
d. If your firm consists of more than one office, is
identification or resolution of such issues handled
at office or firm level?If the former is true, under
what circumstances, if any, are such issues
resolved at the firm level?

YES NO
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e. Does your firm have an alternative or additional
mechanism to identify or resolve professional or
ethical issues not outlined above?
IF SO, please briefly explain that mechanism.

YES NO

f. Are lawyers in your firm made aware of the
mechanisms outlined above?

YES NO

IF SO, how?
10. Does your firm ask lawyers joining the firm to
furnish the firm with information regarding matters
the lawyer handled prior to joining your firm?
IF SO:
a. When is that question asked?
b. Is the lawyer asked to list matters on which he/
she is currently working?
c. Is the lawyer asked to list matters on which he/
she previously worked that are still ongoing?
d. Is the lawyer asked to list matters on which he/
she previously worked that are no longer pending?
e. Is the lawyer asked to list:
1. description of matter?
2. name of individual/partnership/corporation?
3. names of related corporate or partnership
entities?
4. names of partners/corporate officers?
5. names of directors?
6. names of controlling shareholders?
7. names of co-plaintiffs?
8. names of co-defendants?
9. names of opposing counsel?
f. Which of the following questions, if any, is the
lawyer asked regarding his/her role in the matter:
1. Did lawyer supervise?
2. Did lawyer have access to client documents?
3. Did lawyer have access to client information?
4. Was lawyer involved in meetings with client
regarding the matter?
5. Was lawyer involved in meetings with other
lawyers regarding the matter?
6. Did lawyer do work "on the merits"?
7. Was lawyer's role limited to work on procedural matters?
8. Was lawyer's role limited to general research
matters?

YES NO

YES NO N/A
YES NO N/A
YES NO N/A

YES NO N/A
YES NO N/A
YES NO N/A
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES NO N/A
YES NO N/A
YES NO N/A
YES NO N/A
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g. Do you ask any other questions not listed above?

YES NO N/A

IF SO, please briefly describe.
11. Does your firm ask such questions of:
a. lateral hires?
b. new lawyers?
c. paralegals?
d. secretaries or other support staff?
e. law students?
f. members of firm with whom your firm merges?

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

FOR QUESTIONS 12-22: Please circle all answers that
apply; more than one answer may reflect your firm's
policy.
12. Assume a new hire discloses that he/she worked on a
matter for a client whose interests are adverse to
those of a client who the firm currently represents
regarding the same matter.
Is it firm policy to: (CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY)
a. Withdraw from representation of current client?
b. "Screen" new hire from giving or receiving any
Information regarding the matter and continue
representation of current client?
c. Continue representation of the client without use
of a screen?
d. Make a case-by-case determination regarding
whether a screen is advisable?

YES NO
YES NO

YES NO
YES NO

IF SO, please briefly explain what factors are
considered in making that determination and who
makes that determination.
e. Ask new hire's former client for permission to
continue representation of the firm's current client?
f. Proceed only with former client's permission?
g. Follow another course of action not described
above?

YES NO

YES NO
YES NO

IF SO, please describe.
13. Assume a new hire discloses that he/she worked on a
matter for a client whose interests are adverse to the
firm's client on a matter unrelated to the matter
currently pending with your firm.
Is it firm policy to: (CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY)
a. Withdraw from representation of current client?

YES NO
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b. "Screen" new lawyer from giving or receiving any
information regarding the matter and continue
representation of current client?
c. Continue representation of the client without use
of a screen?
d. Make a case-by-case determination regarding
whether a screen is advisable?

[Vol. 52:305
YES NO

YES NO
YES NO

IF SO, please briefly explain what factors are
considered in making that determination and who
makes that determination.
e. Ask new hire's former client for permission to
continue representation of the firm's current client?
f. Proceed only with former client's permission?
g. Follow another course of action?

YES NO

YES NO
YES NO

IF SO, please describe.
14. Assume a new hire discloses that he/she worked on a
matter for a client whose interests are adverse to the
firm's current client. Although the matter handled by
the new hire has been completed and is not currently
pending, the LEGAL issues in that matter are related
to those in the matter currently pending with your
firm.
Is it firm policy to: (CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY)
a. Withdraw from representation of current client?
b. "Screen" new lawyer from giving or receiving any
information regarding the matter and continue
representation of the current client?
c. Continue representation of the client without use
of a screen?
d. Make a case-by-case determination regarding
whether a screen is advisable?
IF SO, please briefly explain what factors are
considered in making that determination and who
makes that determination.
e. Ask new hire's former client for permission to
continue representation of the firm's current client?
f. Proceed only with former client's permission?
g. Follow another course of action?
IF SO, please describe.

YES NO
YES NO

YES NO
YES NO

YES NO

YES NO
YES NO
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15. Assume a new hire discloses that he/she worked on a
matter for a client whose interests are adverse to the
firm's current client.Although the matter handled by
the new hire has been completed and is not currently
pending, the FACTUAL issues in that matter are
related to those in the matter currently pending with
your firm.
Is it firm policy to: (CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY)
a. Withdraw from representation of current client?
b. "Screen" new lawyer from giving or receiving any
information regarding the matter and continue
representation of current client?
c. Continue representation of the client without use
of a screen?
d. Make a case-by-case determination regarding
whether a screen is advisable?

YES NO
YES NO

YES NO
YES NO

IF SO, please briefly explain what factors are
considered in making that determination and who
makes that determination.
e. Ask new hire's former client for permission to
continue representation of the firm's current client?
f. Proceed only with former client's permission?
g. Follow another course of action?

YES NO

YES NO
YES NO

IF SO, please describe.
16. Assume a new hire discloses that he/she worked on a
matter for a client whose interests are adverse to the
firm's current client.The matter handled by the new
hire has been completed and is not currently pending,
and the legal and factual issues in that matter are not
related to those in the matter currently pending with
your firm.
Is it firm policy to: (CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY)
a. Withdraw from representation of current client?
b. "Screen" new lawyer from giving or receiving any
information regarding the matter and continue
representation of current client?
c. Continue representation of the client without use
of a screen?
d. Make a case-by-case determination regarding
whether a screen is advisable?
IF SO, please briefly explain what factors are
considered in making that determination and who
makes that determination.

YES NO
YES NO

YES NO
YES NO
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e. Ask new hire's former client for permission to
continue representation of the firm's current client?
f. Proceed only with former client's permission?
g. Follow another course of action?

YES NO

YES NO
YES NO

IF SO, please describe.
17. Assume a new hire discloses that he/she worked on a
matter for a client whose interests are adverse to the
firm's client.Although the matter handled by the new
hire has been completed and is not currently pending,
and issues in the former case are unrelated to those in
the current case, new hire may have general knowledge regarding the adverse client's personnel, or
regarding business policies or procedures, which may
be relevant to the matter currently pending.
Is it firm policy to: (CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY)
a. Withdraw from representation of current client?
b. "Screen" new lawyer from giving or receiving any
information regarding the matter and continue
representation of current client?
c. Continue representation of the client without use
of a screen?
d. Make a case-by-case determination regarding
whether a screen is advisable?

YES NO
YES NO

YES NO
YES NO

IF SO, please briefly explain what factors are
considered in making that determination and who
makes that determination.
e. Ask new hire's former client for permission to
continue representation of the firm's current client?
f. Proceed only with former client's permission?
g. Follow another course of action?
IF SO, please describe.
18. Assume that all matters new hire previously handled
are not currently pending or have, and no related case
is currently pending in your firm...Briefly describe
what, if anything, is done with the information new
hire provides.
19. Assume firm learns after new hire joins firm but
before any motion to disqualify is filed that new hire
handled a matter for a client whose interests are
adverse to the firm's present client in a matter related
to the matter currently pending.
Is it firm policy to: (CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY)

YES NO

YES NO
YES NO
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a. Withdraw from representation of current client?
b. "Screen" new lawyer from giving. or receiving any
information regarding the matter and continue
representation of the current client?
c. Continue representation of the client without use
of a screen?
d. Make a case-by-case determination regarding
whether a screen is advisable?

YES NO
YES NO

YES NO
YES NO

IF SO, please briefly explain what factors are
considered in making that determination and who
makes that determination.
e. Ask new hire's former client for permission to
continue representation of the firm's current client?
f. Proceed only with former client's permission?
g. Follow another course of action?

YES NO

YES NO
YES NO

IF SO, please describe.
20. Assume firm learns when a motion to disqualify the
firm is filed that new hire handled a matter for a
client whose interests are adverse to the firm's current
client in a matter related to the matter currently
pending.
Is it firm policy to: (CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY)
a. 'Withdraw from representation of current client?
b. "Screen" new lawyer from giving or receiving any
information regarding the matter and continue
representation of current client?
c. Continue representation of the client without use
of a screen?
d. Make a case-by-case determination regarding
whether a screen is advisable?

YES NO
YES NO

YES NO
YES NO

IF SO, please briefly explain what factors are
considered in making that determination and who
makes that determination.
e. Ask new hire's former client for permission to
continue representation of the firm's current client?
f. Proceed only with former client's permission?
g. Follow another course of action?
IF SO, please describe.
21. Assume firm learns it concurrently represents two
clients whose interests are adverse.
Is it firm policy to: (CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY)

YES NO

YES NO
YES NO
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a. Withdraw from representation of one client?
b. IF SO, did you ask client from whom firm

c.
d.

e.
f.
g.
h.

withdrew for permission to represent remaining
client?
Withdraw from representation of both clients?
"Screen" lawyer working on each file from giving
or receiving any information regarding the matter
to the other lawyer and continue representation of
the current clients?
Continue representation of the client without use
of a screen?
Ask both clients for permission to continue?
Proceed only with both clients' permission?
Make a case-by-case determination regarding
whether a screen is advisable?
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YES NO
YES NO N/A

YES NO
YES NO

YES NO
YES NO
YES NO
YES NO

IF SO, please briefly explain what factors are
considered in making that determination and who
makes that determination.
i. Follow another course of action?

YES NO

IF SO, please describe.
22. Assume your firm represented a client whose matter
is completed. Your firm currently represents a client
in a matter related to the past matter.
Is it firm policy to: (CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY)
a. Withdraw from representation of current client?
b. "Screen" lawyer working on file for current client
from giving or receiving any information regarding the matter and continue representation of
current client?
c. Continue representation of the client without use
of a screen?
d. Make a case-by-case determination regarding
whether a screen is advisable?

YES NO
YES NO

YES NO
YES NO

IF SO, please briefly explain what factors are
considered in making that determination and who
makes that determination.
e. Ask former client for permission to continue
representation of the firm's current client?
f. Proceed only with former client's permission?
g. Follow another course of action?

YES NO
YES NO
YES NO

IF SO, please describe.
D. Screening Procedures
23. Has your firm ever used a screen?

YES NO
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a. Is there a written policy regarding screens?

YES NO N/A

IF SO, please attach it to questionnaire.
b. Is there an oral policy regarding screens?
IF SO, please describe it and how it is communicated to the firm.
c. Does the firm conduct seminars or otherwise
provide information about the proper functioning
of screens?

YES NO N/A

YES NO N/A

IF SO, explain.
d. Does firm conduct seminars or otherwise provide
information about confidentiality?

YES NO N/A

IF SO, please explain.
e. Who decides whether a screen is appropriate in a
particular case?
24. Assuming your firm employs screens, does the screen
include the following:
a. Are files segregated?

YES NO N/A

IF SO, how?
b. Who has access to files and how is access
limited?
c. Are computer files indexing client documents
segregated?

YES NO N/A

IF SO, how?
d. Are computer files of documents created by law
firm segregated? (e.g., motions, pleadings, and
other work product)
e. Is the screened lawyer given any information
concerning his/her role in maintaining the screen?

YES NO N/A

YES NO N/A

IF SO, what information is provided?
f. Are parties working on the file informed about the
screen?

YES NO N/A

IF SO, how?
g. Are others working at the firm informed about the
screen?
IF SO, how?
h. Are new lawyers and staff joining the firm after
creation of the screen informed of the screen?
i. Are those informed of the existence of a screen
reminded of the existence of a screen?
IF SO, at what intervals?

YES NO N/A

YES NO N/A
YES NO N/A
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j.

Does the screened lawyer share in fees derived
from the pending case?
k. Is the firm cautioned about raising issues in
screened cases at section meetings or in other
settings where such conversation is likely to arise?
Please explain.
I. Is opposing side advised of existence of screen?
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YES NO N/A
YES NO N/A

YES NO N/A

IF SO, when?
m. Is opposing side asked permission to continue
representation with screen in place?
n. Does firm continue representation with screen in
place if opposing party does not consent?
o. Is your present client advised of the existence of a
screen?
p. Are the consequences of breach of the screen
discussed with present client?

YES NO N/A
YES NO N/A
YES NO N/A
YES NO N/A

IF SO, please briefly explain.
q. Has your firm developed other procedures or
means to screen not outlined above?

YES NO N/A

IF SO, please explain.
25. Is there a policy regarding firm procedure if a screen
is breached?

YES NO N/A

IF SO, please describe.
26. Has a screen erected in your firm been breached?

YES NO N/A

IF SO, briefly describe:
a. How screen was breached.
b. How breach was brought to the firm's attention.
c. What, if any, was the firm's response to the
breach?
d. Was the nature of the information shared relevant
to the firm's response?
IF SO, how?
e. How, if at all, were procedures changed following
breach?
27. Has your firm worked on matters concerning which
the opposing firms have constructed a screen?
28. Has your firm found that other firms have appropriate
safeguards when using screens?
IF NOT, what did your firm find to be lacking?

YES NO
YES NO N/A
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29. Has your firm ever learned that the screen at an
opposing firm was breached?

YES NO N/A

IF SO, please explain with respect to each breach:
a. How did firm learn a breach occurred?
b. What was your firm's response to that information?
(ANSWER YES TO ALL THAT APPLY)
1. Motion to disqualify filed?
2. Motion for sanctions filed?
3. Disciplinary action filed?
4. Lawsuit filed?

YES
YES
YES
YES

IF SO, please state cause of action.
5.

Settlement reached?

YES NO N/A

IF SO, was fact of breach useful to discussions?
Explain.
6.
7.

No response?
Other response not outlined above?

YES NO N/A
YES NO N/A

IF SO, please explain.
30. Do you think that lawyers in opposing firms inform
other lawyers in their firm if a breach occurs?

YES NO

IF NOT why not?
31. Do you think that lawyers in opposing law firms
inform their opponent if a breach occurs?

YES NO

IF NOT, why not?
32. Do you think that lawyers in opposing law firms
inform their clients if a breach occurs?

YES NO

IF NOT, why not?
33. Do you think that opposing screens could be breached
without your firm detecting breach?

YES NO

IF NOT, why not?
34. Do you think that opposing screens have been
breached without your firm detecting breach?
35. Do you think that some breaches are easier to detect
than others?
For example, could your firm detect that opposing
lawyer disclosed the following in violation of screen:
a. documents?
IF SO, how?

YES NO N/A
YES NO

YES NO
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b. facts concerning case?
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YES NO

IF SO, how?
c. business policies or procedures?

YES NO

IF SO, how?
d. shortcuts to discovery?

YES NO

IF SO, how?
e. discovery or trial strategy?

YES NO

IF SO, how?
f. observations concerning character or reputation of
opposing party or experts?

YES NO

IF SO, how?
g. other information (explain).
36. How would your firm go about proving that the
opposing side breached a screen?
37. Do you think opposing lawyers would be less likely
to breach a screen if they were aware of the
possibility of the following sanctions being imposed:
a. discovery sanctions?
b. disqualification?
c. bar discipline?
d. malpractice liability?
e. breach of fiduciary duty liability?
f. intentional tort liability?
g. punitive damages?
h. disgorgement of fees paid to firm?
i. payment of fees necessary for new lawyer to "get
up to speed" on case?
j. loss of clients?
k. other (please describe)?

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

YES NO
YES NO

38. Do you have any additional thoughts or suggestions
regarding how to improve the efficacy of screens?
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS SURVEY.

